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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This is a study of one Islamic party: Hizbut-Tahrir, Wilayat Lubnan (hereafter Hizbut-
Tahrir). It aims to shed light on the history, ideology, and recent stances of this 
important, albeit little researched, player. Founded in Jerusalem in the late 1940s, 
Hizbut-Tahrir established itself on the Lebanese scene in 1953, when its founder – the 
Palestinian Sheikh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani (b.1909 – d.1977) – was evicted by the 
Jordanian authorities and forced to resettle in Lebanon. The study involves a review 
of primary and secondary sources in English and Arabic on Hizbut-Tahrir and Islamic 
movements; as well as interviews with academics, specialists, state officials, and 
Hizbut-Tahrir activists. What gives this study pertinence and currency is that Hizbut-
Tahrir’s recent activism and stances raised many question marks and concerns in 
Lebanon, as well as regionally and internationally. Following the end of the Pax-
Syriana in Lebanon, Hizbut-Tahrir became more active on the Lebanese scene, 
especially in the poor populated suburbs in Tripoli. This study is prompted by at least 
three considerations. The party, despite its activism and presence in several countries, 
has received scant attention in the burgeoning academic literature on Islamic 
movements. Second, Hizbut-Tahrir has heightened its presence and activities in 
Lebanon, particularly in northern Lebanon, after 2005. Third, the party has benefited 
from the weakening of state controls in several Arab countries, in the wake of the 
Arab Spring, in order to play a larger role in the unfolding events, while adhering to 
its ideology that emphasizes the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate and its 
renunciation of violence.   
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Chapter One 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
This is a study of one Islamic party: Hizbut-Tahrir, wilayat Lubnan (hereafter Hizbut-
Tahrir). Throughout the study, we refer to the party by its Arabic name rather than its 
English translation (Islamic Liberation Party). It aims to shed light on the history, 
ideology, and recent stances of this important, albeit little researched, player. This 
study involves a review of primary and secondary sources in English and Arabic on 
Islamic movements as well as interviews with academics, specialists, state officials, 
and activists. There is a plethora of Islamic movements throughout the Arab and 
Islamic world with different ideologies, modes of organization, and levels of appeal. 
This is one example of an Islamic movement that has so far received limited attention 
in the growing literature on political Islam. What gives this study pertinence and 
currency is that the party‟s recent stances raised many question marks and concerns 
locally, regionally, and internationally. Following the end of the pax-syriana in 
Lebanon (El-Husseini, 2012), Hizbut-Tahrir(Islamic Liberation Party) became more 
active on the Lebanese scene -- especially in poor populated suburbs in Tripoli. The 
growing presence, activism, and appeal of the party, particularly in northern Lebanon, 
are what prompted this study. 
By most accounts, Hizbut-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party) dates back to 1953, 
when its founder, the renowned Palestinian judge Taqiuddin al-Nabhani (b.1909 – 
d.1977), began spreading his ideas to select members of the community. These ideas 
centered on the importance of restoring the Islamic Caliphate (Khilafah) based on a 
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three stage approach. Soon afterwards, informal gatherings of party members started 
taking place in Palestine and spread as far as Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. 
Almost invariably, governments reacted with hostility to such activities, imprisoning 
those whom they identified as party members or sympathizers. According to party 
sources, some members were even killed in jail (Al Nabhani, 2010). 
One aim of the thesis is to understand how and when the party appeared on the 
Lebanese scene. This discussion will also focus on the suppression of the party by the 
Syrian-Lebanese security apparatus between the termination of the civil war and the 
end of the pax-Syriana. More importantly, the study will investigate the party‟s 
activities and stances since 2005. 
Hizbut-Tahrir(Islamic Liberation Party) is a political party and not a religious 
order or a charity group. It, however, operates within an Islamic background. In line 
with most Islamic movements, it rejects the separation between religion and politics 
on the grounds that doing so is non-Islamic. The stated overarching goal of the party 
is to restore the Caliph within the Islamic Umma (nation) and to establish Islamic 
rule. In its public statements, Hizbut-Tahrir emphasizes that government must be 
established based on God‟s Book, the Holy Quran, and the noble Sunna of the 
Prophet. In its own self-understanding, the party was established in line with Quranic 
verse 3-104: “let there be among you a group that invites to the good, orders what is 
right and forbids what is evil, and they are those who are successful.”1(Al Nabhani, 
2010). 
The party‟s avowed purpose is to restore the Islamic Umma to its glorious days 
after it had experienced a decline especially in the latter days of the Ottoman Empire 
and during the colonial-mandate period when western powers dominated most parts 
                                                     
1
All translations of Quranic verses are from the party website. 
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of the failed Ottoman Empire (e.g. Egypt, Palestine, and the Levant). According to 
Hizbut-Tahrir, the independent states that emerged after the exit of the European 
colonial-mandate powers proved to be blasphemous (Kufr) states because their 
foundations were borrowed from European powers and contradicted, sometimes 
blatantly, the teachings of Islam and its spirit. The party aims at educating people to 
live the Islamic way in an Islamic society under the umbrella of the Caliph, according 
to rules derived from the Quran and the Sunna -- which are the principle sources of 
Islamic Shari‟a. In the Caliphate state, Muslims choose a Caliph who is appointed 
through Albay‟a (adherence); and his role is to rule based on the Quran and the Sunna 
of the prophet. The role of the Caliph is to spread the message of Islam through 
Alda‟wa (call for belief) and to protect the Islamic Umma through calling for Jihad 
against those who threaten its independence and core interests. The party aims to 
rescue the Islamic Umma from its dark period and to restore it to the ranks of the 
major world powers. This is to be achieved through educating people -- especially 
Muslims -- on Islam and how it can provide the bases for transforming the current 
realities of the Muslim Umma.  
In the doctrine of the party, the Muslim Umma must confront infidels and states 
that promote infidelity (kufr).  This confrontation need not be a violent or military 
one. Since it is a party for all Muslims, every Muslim, irrespective of gender, color, 
and race can be a member of Hizbut-Tahrir. Equally important -- at least as it 
mentions in its public statements --the party claims to be open to all Muslims 
irrespective of their doctrinal beliefs (Mazhab). Members of the party must commit to 
the Islamic doctrine: Al- Aqeeda. This commitment is supposed to have a 
transformational effect on party members leading them to blend with the other 
members and to work together to spread the Aqeeda (Al Nabhani, 2001). 
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The calling (Al Da‟wa) for Islam is the principle driving force of the party. 
Through the calling, the party aims at instilling Islamic faith and ideas among 
nominally Muslim populations in Muslim-majority states. Members of Hizbut-Tahrir 
are expected to rebel against ideas that contravene God‟s teachings and to reject 
actions that displease God. They are to abide by and promote the lawful (Al Halal) 
and to stay away from and discourage the prohibited (Al Haram). (one of the best 
studies on the lawful and the prohibited from an Islamic perspective is Yusuf 
Qaradawi, the lawful and the Prohibited…) The Islamic creed (Aqeeda) is at the core 
of a comprehensive political doctrine that establishes a system for dealing with all the 
problems that people face: whether social, cultural, economic, and political. While 
Islam like all universal religions does not recognize borders, Hizbut-Tahrir is highly 
cognizant that it must begin its work in the most hospitable environment, namely 
states with large concentrations of Muslims. 
As noted above, the party‟s manifesto (first articulated by al-Nabhani) emphasizes 
change through three stages: The first stage involves inculcating Islamic ideas and 
values among individuals. The second stage revolves around spreading those thoughts 
gradually, through interactions among party members and with other members of the 
Islamic Umma, in order to achieve as large a following as possible. The third stage, 
which is the natural culmination of the first two, is to implement concrete steps in 
order to establish an Islamic government (the Khilafa), which defends the Muslim 
Umma and spreads the message of Islam to the whole world (Al Nabhani, T. 2001). 
As the study will demonstrate, this is a controversial ideology, as some of its tenets 
are criticized by mainstream Islamic figures such as the renowned cleric sheikh 
Yousuf al-Qaradawi (Baroudi, 2014). 
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In light of Hizbut-Tahrir‟s greater room for maneuver following the withdrawal of 
Syrian troops from Lebanon, a significant portion of the thesis will be devoted to 
presenting the party‟s stances on local and regional developments. In this regard, it 
must be noted that it was only in 2006 that the party was legalized by Lebanon‟s 
Ministry of Interior. This enabled the party to act in the open and to publicly present 
its positions regarding developments in Lebanon and the region. This thesis aims to 
capture the party‟s stances as far as present realities in Lebanon and the country‟s 
future prospects. Moreover, the thesis identifies the party‟s positions on regional 
issues, with regard to the question of Palestine, the Arab spring and most importantly 
the ongoing conflagration in neighboring Syria. 
Methodology: 
This study relies on a blend of secondary and primary sources. The secondary 
sources are used to place the study in its proper historic and ideational contexts. They 
focus on Islamic movements and the modern history and politics of Lebanon and the 
Arab world. The primary sources comprise the literatureof Hizbut-Tahrir -- whether 
in publications or material that is posted on the party‟s official 
website.(www.hizbuttahrir.org). This material,which includes references in Arabic 
and English, is the primary source as far as the ideology of the party and its relations 
with the Lebanese state and other Islamic parties are concerned. The primary sources 
inform us about the thought of sheikh al-Nabhani and party activities and stances as 
seen by the party itself. Last but not least, I rely on interviews with selected party 
activists who helped me understand how the party operates. Given the limited 
academic literature on Hizbut-Tahrir, the party material and the interviews (i.e.The 
primary sources) were indispensible for conducting this study.  
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The main questions that the study raises these are presented as follows: To start 
with, what is the historic and ideational context in which the thought of al-Nabhani, 
which became the linchpin of the Islamic liberation party program, emerged? Second, 
what are the main tenets of the thought of the party founder? Third, how did the party 
thought and membership spread from Jerusalem and its environs to cover most Arab 
countries as well as other majority-Muslim countries (e.g. Indonesia) and the Western 
countries. Fourth, how did the party establish itself in Lebanon and how did it relate 
to other Lebanese Islamic movement and to the Lebanese state during the many 
phases that the Lebanese political system went through (ie pre-civil war in Lebanon, 
the civil war years, the pax-Syriana period, and the current phases since the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops in spring 2005). Fifth, what are the party‟s stances 
regarding the Palestinian issue especially since the establishment of the Palestinian 
National Authority (PNA) IN 1993? Sixth, how did the party perceive the Arab spring 
and how does it situate itself vis-a-vis the unfolding events. Last but not least, have 
the recent changes contributed to a more hospitable environment for the fulfillment of 
the party‟s long dream of reestablishing the Islamic caliphate? Through addressing 
these questions, the thesis hopes to acquaint the reader with the thought and praxis of 
a hither to little studied Islamic movement.  
 
Outline of the thesis: 
Because this is a case study that requires work with primary material in Arabic, it 
sacrifices breadth for depth. In other words, the focus shall remain on this specific 
party, rather than casting the net too widely to cover Islamic movements and political 
Islam. Chapter two provides a detailed overview of the thought of the party founder 
Sheikh Taquiuddin al-Nabhani and the historic and ideational trends that influenced 
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his thinking. Chapter three focuses on one concrete manifestation of al-Nabhani‟s 
thought and activism; the founding of Hizbut-Tahrir Wilayat Lubnan.Chapter four 
takes us back to Palestine, the birth place of Hizbut-Tuhrir. It reviews theParty of 
Liberation stances on the Palestinian struggle; and in particular party activism in Gaza 
and the west bank since the inception of the autonomous Palestinian authority in 
1993. It also provides an exposé of the party stances on regional issues since the onset 
of the Arab Spring. Finally, chapter five is the concluding chapter which reviews 
again the main ideas of the thesis.  
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Chapter Two 
 
 
 
The Life and Thought of Sheikh Mohamad 
Taqiuddin al-Nabhani and the Founding of Hizbut-
Tahrir 
 
 
 
This chapter introduces Hizbut-Tahrir and Mohamad Taqiuddinal-Nabhani, its 
founder. It elaborates on the major historical and ideological influences that shaped up 
al-Nabhani‟s life and attend to the family and environment he grew up in. After a 
discussion of the development of the party, the chapter discusses some of the 
important principles upheld by Hizbut-Tahrir and elaborates on its spread throughout 
the corners of the globe.  
2.1 Introducing Mohamad Taqiuddin Al-Nabhani 
 
Mohamad Taqiuddin bin Ibrahim bin Mustafa bin Ismail bin Yusuf al-Nabhani‟s 
lineage is traced back to the ancient Arab tribe of Bani Nabhan, which settled in the 
village of Ijzim (currently in the West Bank) in the district of Safad in the 18
th
 
century. Safad had belonged to the city of Haifa in the north of Palestine and the 
Jewish settlement of Kiral Mehral was established on its ruins in 1949.  
Aside from being fond of religious science and literature, al-Nabhani‟s family was 
among those who cherished the Ottoman caliphate. Within the confines of this family, 
Taqiuddin al-Nabhani memorized the entire Holy Quran before the age of thirteen, 
and was taught the Shari‟a by his father Sheikh Ibrahim as well as by his grandfather 
Sheikh Yusuf al-Nabhani
2
.  
                                                     
2
 Sheikh Yusuf al-Nabhani studied at al- Azhar and then went on to work as an editor at the printing 
house of "al-Jawai‟b” newspaper in al-Astana. Upon his return to the Levant, he resided in Beirut for 
nearly twenty years after working in the judiciary world and becoming the head of its Court of Law in 
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Taquiddin Al-Nabhani was born in in 1914. As aforementioned, he was taught the 
principles of religious science by his father and maternal grandfather; the latter also 
helped him memorize the Holy Quran at a young age. Al-Nabhani began his 
elementary studies in Palestine‟s public schools, he then moved to Acre („Akka) in 
order to continue high school(Spencer & Roberts, 2008), but he did not complete his 
studies there. At his grandfather, Sheikh Yusuf al-Nabhani‟s, wish he traveled to 
Cairo, instead, in an attempt to join the prestigious al-Azhar school.  He enrolled in 
al-Azhar high school in Egypt and graduated with honors. He was then admitted to its 
Faculty of Sciences where he attended seminars conducted by sheikhs his grandfather 
had introduced him to such as Sheikh Mohamad al-Khodor Hussein -- whose 
influence on the young al-Nabhani will be explained in a later chapter.  
In 1932, al-Nabhani graduated from al-Azhar University with a degree in Shari‟a 
law and a diploma in Arabic language and literature from al-Azhar‟s Faculty of 
Science. Between 1929 and 1932 he worked toward and earned a bachelor‟s degree in 
judiciary studies from the Higher Institute of Islamic courts, which is also under al-
Azhar‟s jurisdiction. Afterwards, he took a teaching post in the field of Islamic 
religious law at the Palestinian department in the secondary schools of Haifa. Later on 
in 1938he applied to join the religious courts (Shari‟a courts) because he preferred to 
be in the judiciary field where several of his colleagues, who had previously studied 
with him at al-Azhar, were then working. With their help, he was appointed as a clerk 
                                                                                                                                                        
1887 A.D. He then traveled to Medina, and when the First World War broke out, he returned back to 
his village, where he spent his last days.Al-Nabhani wrote several books on the topics of Sufism, 
literature, Hadith (Prophetic tradition), history, and Interpretation of the Quran (Tafseer), and more 
than 48 of his books went to print, most of which he had composed during his stay in Beirut. He has 
several books criticizing Ibn Taymiyyah(from the school of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, 1263-1328) and Ibn 
Qayyem al-Jawziah(1292-1350) (Wahhabi figures). Some of his notable publications include:A 
Compilation of the Dignities of the Islamic Rulers “Jame‟ Karamat al-Awliya,” The Collection of Al-
Nabhani‟s Praise of Prophet) "al-Majmou‟ah al-Nabhaniyah fil-Madai‟h al-Nabawiyyah," and The 
Small Wonder "al-Rai‟ah al-Soughrah," the last of which is a long poem that criticizes Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani, Sheikh Mohamad Abdo and Mohamad Rashid Rida(Spencer& Roberts, 2008). 
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to the court of Bissan, after which he was transferred to Tiberas, and then to Haifa as 
the head of clerks in Haifa‟s religious court (Al Nadawi, 1965). 
In 1945, he was appointed as a judge at the Court of Ramla (an ancient Arab city 
between Jaffa and Jerusalem which used to be one of the five districts of al-sham 
province under the Abbasid and Ummayad Empires) in Palestine. He served as vice 
president of the association “Al I‟tisam,” which was founded by Sheikh Mohamad 
Nimr al-Khatib in Haifa in 1941 with the purpose of combating prostitution, alcohol-
consumption and gambling among other vices. There, he met Hassan al-Banna‟s (the 
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood) brother-in-law, Saeed Ramadan, who called him 
to join Sheikh al-Khatib and the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Al-Nabhani, 
however, did not respond positively to the call because he wished to focus on his 
career. In 1946, al-Nabhani met Abdul Aziz al-Khayat in Ramla. Al-Khayat (b.1891 - 
d.1970) was one of the first Palestinians to join the growing ranks of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Palestine. Al-Khayat, however, would later leave the brotherhood to 
join al-Nabhani‟s Hizbut-Tahrir after the latter founded the party. This incident 
highlights the fluidity of Islamic movements, in the sense that it is not uncommon for 
Islamists to move from one Islamic party to another; it also exposes some of the basic 
similarities of thought between the Brotherhood and other smaller movements such as 
Hizbut-Tahrir.   
Following the Palestine war in 1948, al-Nabhani left Ramla for Damascus. But 
later, in the same year, he returned home to become a judge on the Shari‟a Court of 
Jerusalem. In 1951, al-Nabhani arrived in Amman, Jordan where he settled until the 
beginning of 1953 – which is also the year Hizbut – Tahrir was established. As the 
thesis will later demonstrate, Hizbit-Tahrir has been, for years, part of the Islamic 
movements‟ scene in Jordan (Alaywan, 2009). Although al-Nabhani was traveling 
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around the region during this period, the bulk of his energies were devoted to 
promoting the new party in Palestine and its environs.   
2.2 Sheikh al-Nabhani and The Founding of Hizbut-Tahrir 
 
Hizbut-Tahrir was founded in the city of Jerusalem in 1953. At that time, Sheikh al-
Nabhani had become a member of the Shari‟a Court of Appeal in Jerusalem. 
Undoubtedly, though, the official launching of the party was preceded by several 
years of planning, which probably started as early as 1949. Around 1953, al-Nabhani 
met with several religious figures and „ulama, including Sheikh Ahmed Daour, Nemr 
el-Masri, Daoud Hamdan, Adel al-Nabulsi, Ghanem Abdo, Munir Shoukeir, and 
Sheikh Abdul Qadeem Zalloum near Jerusalem.  It is worth noting that Sheikh Abdul 
Qadeem Zalloum-- who hails from al-Khalil city -- eventually became second in 
command to Sheikh al-Nabhani in the hierarchy of Hizbut-Tahrir. With al-Nabhani in 
the lead, these figures formed the nucleus of the new party (Al Kilani, 1995).  
Due to the senior position he came to occupy in the party, a brief discussion of the 
life of Sheikh Abdul Qadeem Zalloum is worthwhile. Sheikh Zalloum was the son of 
sheikh Yousef bin Abdul-Qadim bin Younes bin Ibrahim al-Sheikh Zalloum. He 
came from a family that was well known for its religious devotion; his father, who 
had worked as a teacher during the Ottoman period was the one who taught him how 
to memorize the Holy Quran. His father's uncle, Abdul Ghaffar Younis Zalloum was 
the mufti of al-Khalil during the Ottoman Empire. The Zalloums were one of the 
families that served in the Ibrahimi Mosque in Jerusalem.  
Sheikh Abdul Qadeem Zalloum was born and raised in the city of al-Khalil until 
he was fifteen years old, completing his primary education at the Abrahamic School 
of al-Khalil before joining al-Azhar University to learn the principles of jurisprudence 
(fiqh) in 1939. He received his first merit degree from al-Azhar mosque in 1942 and 
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his Shari‟ah law degree with a specialization in jurisdiction from the Faculty of 
Shari‟ah (also from al-Azhar) in 1949. 
After that, he taught in the schools of Bethlehem for two years after which he 
moved back to al-Khalil, in 1951, to also work as a teacher. In 1952, he met Sheikh 
Taqiuddin al-Nabhani and started to go regularly go to Jerusalem in order to 
coordinate and further discuss the development of Hizbut-Tahrir with him. He joined 
the party upon its inception in 1953; rising to a leading position by 1956.  He 
published several books which include: Funds in the Khilafah State “Al Amwal fi 
Dawlat Alkhilafah," Hizbut-Tahrir's Curriculum for Change, “Manhaj Hizbut-Tahrir 
fi AlTaghyir,” and Definitions in Hizbut-Tahrir “Altaarif Fi Hizbut-Tahrir.The last of 
these books enshrined several of Hizbut-Tahrir‟s principles, which became part of its 
doctrine.Sheikh Zalloum passed away of natural causes on April 29,2003 and was 
buried at the same site in Beirut as al-Nabhani (Esposito, 2003). 
Going back to the founding of the party, in 1952, the founding members of 
Hizbut-Tahrir formally applied before the Jordanian Ministry of Interior to obtain a 
license allowing them to establish a political party. The party‟s cabinet came to 
comprise Taqiuddin al-Nabhani as president, Daoud Hamdan as vice president and 
secretary, Ghanem Abdo as treasurer. Two other key founding members were Adel 
al-Nabulsi and Munir Shoukeir.Towards the end of the first Arab-Israeli war, an 
armistice agreement was signed between Israel and Jordan, on April 13, 1949. The 
terms of the armistice left Jordan in control of the West Bank including East 
Jerusalem. In 1950, Jordan formally annexed the West Bank; an act was then 
criticized by the Arab league and other parties (Moussalli, 2004). 
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On March 14, 1953, with its base located in Jerusalem, Hizbut-Tahrir obtained the 
license to commence its party activities according to the enforceable Ottoman law on 
associations. However, on March 22, 1953 the Jordanian authorities had a change of 
mind, issuing a statement which considered Hizbut-Tahrir illegal, thereby prohibiting 
its members from any party-related activity. Subsequently, the authorities arrested 
some party members. This banning of the party, so soon after its emergence, was due 
to the authorities‟ heightened suspicions regarding its political aims (Al Kilani, 1995). 
In November 1953, the Jordanian authorities forced al-Nabhani to flee Palestine to 
Damascus; he was not allowed to return because of the ban on the party‟s activities. 
In Damascus, the Syrian authorities arrested al-Nabhani, forcing him out of Syria and 
into Lebanon. Although Syria at the time was still -- at least on paper -- a 
parliamentary democracy, then Syrian president, Adib al-Shishakli was showing signs 
of unease toward the operations of Islamic movements such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the smaller Hizbut-Tahrir. Equally important is the fact that al-
Shiskakli had a good rapport with king Talal bin Abdullah of Jordan. Al-Shishakli 
believed that king Talal had abandoned old Hashemite ambitions about annexing 
Syria and wanted to avoid a confrontation with him. In a nutshell, the Syrian 
authorities saw little benefit and no political capital to be generated from granting 
asylum to the exiled Sheikh. Accordingly, they sought to deport him to neighboring 
Lebanon. Initially, the Lebanese authorities refused to admit al-Nabhani to Lebanon, 
which meant that he would remain in the neutral zone between Lebanon and Syria, 
but following the intercession of then Mufti of the Lebanese Republic Sheikh Hassan 
al-Alaya (who was Mufti between 1952 and1966), he was granted permission to enter 
Lebanese territory. The involvement of Mufti al-Alaya in this issue reflected al-
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Nabhani‟s growing influence outside Palestine and his recognition as a religious 
scholar of significant standing (Al Markaz Al Arabi, 2006). 
Following al-Nabhani‟s departure in 1953, Sheikh Abdul Qadeem Zalloum and 
Sheikh Ahmad Daour became in charge of party affairs in Palestine in 1956. This 
period witnessed the beginning of fractures within the party, as two of the founding 
members –Daoud Hamdan and Nemr al-Masri – left the party because they believed 
that al-Nabhani was not consulting enough with the other leaders, which ran contrary 
to the principle of al-Shoura (Alaywan, 2009). 
Benefiting from Lebanon‟s relatively open political system, Sheikh al-
Nabhani worked on spreading his ideas among the Lebanese educated youth; he 
managed to do so without interference until 1958. The year 1958 was a critical one in 
Lebanon‟s history because it witnessed the revolt of the country‟s Muslim leaders 
against the Christian dominated regime of Camille Chamoun (1952-1958). During 
that year, the Lebanese authorities began to restrict al-Nahhani‟s movement after 
realizing that his ideas were threatening the fragile status quo and sectarian balance in 
the country. To avoid arrest, al-Nabhani fled Beirut to Tripoli, which at the time was 
under the control of Chamoun‟s opposition (Attie, 2004). 
During the reign of Abdul Salam „Aref, between 1963 and 1966, and while being 
primarily based in Lebanon, Sheikh al-Nabhani traveled to Iraq several times. 
Although sources are vague on this issue, for understandable reasons, one can only 
speculate that al-Nabhani and the Iraqi leader saw some mutual benefit from striking 
up a friendship. Arguably, „Aref wanted to strengthen ties with Sunni religious 
leaders who would contribute to undermining the secular Arab nationalist ideology 
championed by Egyptian President Jamal Abdul Nasser. In its own publications, 
Hizbut Tahrir justifies these visits on the grounds of al-Nabhani‟s support for the 
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people of Iraq. Relations with „Aref, however, deteriorated, for reasons we are not 
aware of (although we can speculate that it had to do with the Nasser-Aref 
rapprochement and it is in this context that one must read the arrest and torture of al-
Nabhani at the hands of the Iraqi security services) (Al Nabhani, 2010). On December 
11, 1977, Sheikh al-Nabhani passed away in Beirut of natural causes and was buried 
near al- Khashekji mosque in the martyrs‟ cemetery (Wagemakers, 2012).  
2.3 Principles of Hizbut – Tahrir 
 
Undoubtedly, the restoration of the Islamic caliphate represents the overarching goal 
of Hizbut-Tahrir. It is also the central idea in the thought of al-Nabhani. This belief 
that the unity of the Muslim Umma is to be achieved through the reestablishment of 
the caliphate is the linchpin of the party ideology. Al-Nabhani‟swritings 
provideconsiderable insights on: 1)why the caliphate is needed,2) its functions and 3) 
the means to restore it. Al-Nabhani provides a succinct definition of the office of the 
Caliphate “It is the general head for all Muslims in order to establish the provisions of 
Islamic Sharia and to carry the call of Islam to the world; it is both the imamate and 
the caliphate in one.”The caliph3 is thus simultaneously a ruler with extensive (albeit 
not unbounded powers); as well as the principal spokesman for Islam and its chief 
advocate.  
To reiterate, in line with al-Nabhani‟s thought, the end goal of the party is to set 
up the caliphate. Al Nabhani defines the concept of the caliphate and explainsthe 
conditions for setting it up. He goes on to explain the means of adherence (albayaa) 
tothe caliph as well as who participates in this process. Furthermore, al-Nabhani 
caters to all possible scenarios and circumstances that the Umma might be subjected 
                                                     
3
 The Caliph heads the caliphate. It is the official title for the head of state of the Islamic Umma 
(Islamic community ruled by Sharia). 
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to from the removal of the caliph to the Umma's loss of the caliphate -- as is the 
reality today -- which is described in al-Nabhani‟s volume "The Caliphate" (Al 
khilafah). This important work by al-Nabhani has become a major reference point for 
the party of Liberation on this issue. In Al-khilafah– which is part of a larger tome 
entitled "The Islamic Character" (Al-Shakhsiyya al-Islamiyya) – al-Nabhani states that 
setting up the caliphate is the duty of every Muslim residing in every corner of the 
globe. Accordingly, working for the reestablishment of the caliphate is a duty 
incumbent on all Muslims just like the other religious duties (al-Faraed); such as 
prayer, fasting and paying alms.  
Al-Nabhani believes that allegiance to the caliph can be expressed with a 
handshake or in writing. In this regard, he does not discriminate between men and 
women. Women can shake hands with the caliph as part of the ceremony of al-Bay‟a, 
the same way men can. This symbolic acknowledgement of women‟s role in al-bay‟a 
is not recognized by the mainstream Sunni sects; namely: the Shafi, Hanafi, Maliki, 
andHanbali sects. 
To qualify to this supreme office within the Muslim Umma, the Caliph must 
demonstrate the following attributes: First, he must be an adult Muslim male of a 
mature age and of proven Quarayshi descent (Quraysh being the tribe of the Prophet 
Muhammad). Second, he must demonstrate the qualities of rational reasoning and 
arguing and befair to all members of the Umma. Third, he must labor tirelessly for the 
causes of the Umma, and dedicate all his energies (and those of his immediate 
subordinates) to ensure rule in accordance to the Sharia. Finally, he must ensure that 
sufficient resources are allocated to support the spreading of the message of Islam 
globally. 
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While Al-Nabhani does not provide clear answers to how the Caliph is to be 
chosen, he recommends several approaches to facilitate the process of selection. Al-
Nabhani does not object to the recent methods of voting, such as casting a secret 
ballot, for one‟s preferred candidate. In a nutshell, modern processes can be used to 
fill this highly traditional office(Abu Al Rashta, 2005).  
Al-Nabhani disagrees with the opinion that Sharia dictates the person who 
occupies the office of Caliph. For him, this notion contradicts the principle of 
declaring allegiance (albaya‟) in person or through voting. Al-Nabhani‟s 
understanding of the caliphate can be summarized as follows. First, the Caliph has to 
be chosen by members of the Muslim community. In al-Nabhani‟s reading of Islamic 
history, the prophet did not appoint a successor inorder not to bind the hands of his 
surviving companions. While Sharia requires the presence of a Caliph to lead the 
Umma, the selection of this person is to be done by Muslims. Choice based on 
knowledge of the qualifications of the contesters is an indispensible element of proper 
Islamic governance. In this regard, Al- Nabhani notes: “The office of prophecy and 
conveying the message is separate from that of ruling the community because 
prophecy is a divine gift bestowed by Allah, while the office of the Caliph is an 
earthly position to which Muslims choose whomever they deem fit to rule over them 
as Caliph”. The Caliph thus discharges of the temporal duties that were one exercised 
by the Prophet; but he does not (and cannot) assume any prophetic role, since 
prophecy ended with Muhammad(Al Nabhani, 2001).  
 Al Nabhani laments the absence of qualifiedstate men who could assume the 
tremendous duties of the office of Caliph and discharge of these duties in such a 
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manner as to bring felicity to the rise of Muslims and alleviate the status of the 
Muslim Umma to place it at par or even ahead of all other nations (Zalloum, 2002).  
In an accompanying volume "The Islamic State,"(Al-Dawla al-Islamiyya),al-
Nabhani warns of the dangers of infatuation with western democracy and western 
culture. For al-Nabhani western culture is a product of the colonial west which 
subjugated Muslim people and poisoned their minds against true Islamic rule. It is 
only by rejecting western democracy and culture that Muslims can genuinely become 
independent of the west and masters of their own destiny. 
In al-Nabhani‟s view, the role of Hizbut-Tahrir is not to lend legitimacy to nations 
whose boundaries were drawn by the European colonial powers, but to work to 
abolish these artificial borders in order to reestablish the unity of the Muslim Umma 
through resurrecting the one Caliphate. At its essence, the project of restoring the 
Caliphate is about reestablishing the lost unity of the Muslim Umma.Al-Nabhani 
offers a somewhat innovative reading of the life of the Prophet Mohamad. In line with 
the Islamic tradition, he distinguishes between the Meccan and Madinian periods. In 
the Meccan period, al-Nabhani notes the prophet consecrated himself to spreading the 
message of Islam in his community through purely peaceful means. The prophet 
endured persecution for years. It was only after the migration to Medina and the 
growth in the number and power of Muslims that the prophet assumed temporal duties 
as the ruler or the first Muslim community. Al-Nabhani sees himself as treading in the 
path of the prophet when he focuses on spreading his ideas which to whom emanate 
from a true understanding of Islam. The ultimate goal of reestablishing the Caliphate 
cannot be achieved instantly;it requires arduous and long work to educate Muslims on 
the centrality of the Caliphate in Islam(Al Nabhani, 2002). 
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In line with al-Nabhani‟s thinking, Hizbut - Tahrir focuses on the principles that 
should guide the transition from a divided weak Umma to a united strong Umma 
under the Caliphate state. These principles include: First and foremost, the 
sovereignty of the Sharia in the sense that there should be no manmade laws that 
contravene the Sharia. Stated otherwise, the lives of Muslims ought to be guided by 
divine rules that are enshrined in the holy Quran and the noble Sunna of the Prophet. 
In support of this, Hizbut-Tahrir invokes the following Quranic verse: "All ye who 
believe obey Allah and obey the prophet and those who have command over you." 
Second, the Sharia needs to be applied in the context of the needs of the time. It is the 
role of the Caliph supported by the Ulama (religious scholars) to adapt the Sharia to 
contemporary circumstances and to derive, when needed, specific laws from the 
Sharia. Third, reestablishing the Caliphate is a collective duty that all true Muslims 
need to engage in.Last but not least, upon the selection of the Caliph, it becomes 
incumbent on him to ensure that the Sharia is properly applied in all ways of life. This 
is a multifaceted task requiring the promulgation of new laws based on Sharia and the 
implementation of these laws in a fair and prompt manner. In a nutshell, the Caliphate 
state is administered by a competent and honest Caliph who is supported by 
competent aides; and who rules not based on individual whim or caprice, but in line 
with the dictates of the Sharia. 
Hizbut -Tahrir emphasizes that the Caliph must govern based on an Islamic 
constitution. This Islamic constitution is to be drawn by prominent Ulama who are 
steeped in Islamic sciences and who understand the prevalent political and social 
realities facing Muslims (Zalloum, 2002).  
 2.4 Sheikh al-Nabhani’s Background and Influences on his Thought 
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This section considers three broad types of influences on the thought of al-
Nabhani which also impacted the creed of the party he founded. The first set of 
influences is historic in nature pertaining to 1)European encroachments on the 
Ottoman Empire, 2) the imposition of the British mandate on Palestine which 
culminated with Palestine‟s partition, and 3) the abolishment of the Islamic Caliphate 
and failed attempts to restore it in the Arab World. The second set of influences is 
ideological and pertains to the clash between the beliefs of al-Nabhani and each of 
Marxism and Arab nationalism. Finally, the third set revolves around family 
influences.   
2.4.1 Historic Influences 
 
Arguably, it was the British mandate in Palestine, and British support for Jewish 
immigration, that provided the initial impetus for al-Nabhani‟s political thought and 
activism. Al-Nabhani spent his formative years in Palestine which was then under the 
British mandate (1918-1948). The Zionist assault on Palestine that ensued after the 
British mandate fueled his future political endeavors. Like the overwhelming majority 
of Palestinians, al-Nabhani was opposed to the Zionist project in Palestine and to the 
British occupation and its acquiescence for the Zionist project. Therefore, the thought 
of al-Nabhani, and the party he founded, ought to be considered, first and foremost, in 
the context of local resistance to the Western colonial project whose main 
manifestation was support for Jewish immigration to Palestine and later to the 
country‟s partition between Arabs and Jews. In a nutshell, this principled opposition 
to the “Western-Zionist Colonial” project in Palestine and the Arab world represented 
the bedrock for the political thought of al-Nabhani (Al Nabhani, 1950). 
Al-Nabhani was cognizant of the conspiracy against Palestine and the multiple 
schemes to compromise its Arab and Islamic character. In al-Nabhani‟s view, 
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Palestine had a known and clear enemy, “the Jews -- a “sly and deceitful enemy,” 
Britain, and finally the Arab countries who had claimed their commitment to Palestine 
by sending their armies only to stand at the divisive border without really fighting. In 
fact, Sheikh al-Nabhani goes on to explicitly accuse the Arab states of conspiracy, and 
insists that the only thing the Arabs achieved by entering Palestine was to halt the 
Jews at the borders they had already reached.This demonstrated that they did not enter 
the country to really destroy the Jewish state or reverse the partition because it would 
compromise their international relations in general and relations with Britain in 
particular. Regional ambitions and personal hatred stopped the Arabs from taking the 
proper military decisions that would have led to the freedom of Palestine(Al Nabhani, 
1950). 
In October 1947, a plan that addresses the imminent Palestinian crises was 
approved at the Alley meeting in Mount Lebanon. This plan stipulated that the 
reliance in resisting the Jewish state is on the Palestinian people and that the Arab 
states will however supply arms, ammunition and money while remaining at the 
borders. Nonetheless, this plan was hijacked. In fact, the Mufti of Palestine al-Haj 
Mohamad Amin al-Husseini (b. 1895 – d. 1974) reveals in his memoirs that due to 
British and Jewish pressure on the Arabs, the plan was modified.Furthermore, these 
foreign powers convinced the Arabs to distance Palestinians from the battle, and 
pushed some of them to bring in their armies, instead, into Palestine.  Moreover, 
following the modification of the plan, the Arab League took some dubious decisions, 
which according to critics, aimed at intentionally weakening the Palestinian resistance 
to the increasingly assertive and militant Jewish settlers.  
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These measures allegedly included. First, the Arab League cut off all financial aid 
which had been approved during the Bloudan Conference
4
 in Syria in 1946.Equally 
important, it confiscated all money donated by the Arab people. Last but not least, the 
military commission that the Arab League had appointed refrained from distributing 
weapons (which the political committee of the Arab League had already approved in 
1947), and fourth, the military committee confiscated the abundant weapons which 
the Lebanese people had paid for in 1947 to arm al-Mujahidin under the leadership of 
Abdul Kader Husseini.  
During this difficult period, Hajj Mohamad Amin al-Husseini emerged as a first-
class political symbol and as a religious figure immersed in politics, especially after 
he lost his bet on the Central Powers led by Germany during World War II, which had 
dreamed would eliminate the Zionists and liberate Palestine. Consequently, it is worth 
mentioning that he was expelled from Palestine for thirty years between 1937 and 
1967 (Al Hout, 1986). Clearly then, al-Nabhani was not the only religious figure to be 
drawn to politics due to the turbulence that Palestine witnessed in the later 1940s and 
1950s.  
Equally important, the thought of al-Nabhani ought to be placed in the context of 
thecenturies of decline of Ottoman power beginning from the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries and the concomitant growth of the power of the Christian west. 
The growing imbalance of power between the Muslim East and the Christian West 
forced the Ottoman sultans to grant many concessions to western powers and their 
Christian protégés in the Ottoman Empire. These continuous encroachments on the 
rights and privileges of the Muslim population left strong imprints on the character 
and thought of many Muslim figures throughout the Islamic world. From an Islamic 
                                                     
4
 The Bloudan conference, which was held in Bloudan, Syria, was a response to the British-American 
committee decisions that agreed on dividing Palestine (Aloudwan, 2009). 
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point of view, the final coup de grace came with the abolishing of the Ottoman 
caliphate in 1924 at the hands of the secular Turkish officers, who were led by 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (who became the béte noire for many Islamic movements). 
 The Islamic response to the shift in the balance of power in favor of the Christian 
West and the corresponding encroachments of Western powers and Western 
institutions, norms and beliefs prompted the emergence of local Islamic resistance 
movements against European and US colonialism. Hizbut-Tahrir was one of these 
movements, albeit not the first. For instance, and in other parts of the Muslim world, 
in an earlier period, Abdelkader al-Jazaeiri (b. 1808 – d. 1883) launched armed 
resistance against the French in Algeria. In Sudan, and in response to British 
colonialism, the al-Mahdiya movement emerged to confront British occupation. In 
Libya, the al-Sanussiya movement fought against the Italian occupation, triggering a 
relentless and violent campaign to quell opposition taking the lives of thousands of 
Libyans in the process (Al Ansari, 1980). 
 
This resistance, however, did not succeed in defeating Western encroachments 
and was largely ineffective. Subsequently, several Muslim intellectuals and activists 
sought to better understand and emulate the scientific and military achievements of 
the West in order to contain Western attempts at further expansion. In this context of 
limited reconciliation with the West, the so called reconciliatory ("al-Tawfikiyya" ) 
movement emerged. Painting with a broad brush, advocates of al-Tawfikiyya believed 
in a nuanced approach to the West. They understood the importance of drawing on the 
achievements of the West in the military, scientific and even intellectual spheres in 
order to improve the lot of the Muslim world. However, such advocates remained 
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entrenched to the basic teachings of the Islamic religion (although they understood 
them differently from most of their predecessors).  
Equally important, they rejected the assimilation of the Muslim world into the 
west and sought to resist -- primarily via peaceful means. It is in this context of 
renewal that advocates of al-Tawikiyya sought to promote an understanding of Islam 
that does not place it necessarily on a collision course with Western culture. Broadly 
speaking, and despite individual differences in approach, this movement was led by 
diverse figures such as Jamal Eddin al-Afghani (1838-1897), Mohamad Abdo (1849-
1905) and Abdul Rahman al-Kawakibi (1854-1902). The movement demonstrated 
openness to external influences (as long as they did not contradict the basic principles 
of Islam) and accepted co-existence with Europe, contrary to Islamic fundamentalism, 
of which more will be said further on.  
In sum, the al-Tawfikiyya movement preaches that Islam accepts all that is true, 
essential and necessary for society to survive and flourish, taking into account the 
realities of time and space. This openness is anchored in many Qur‟anic verses that 
encourage Muslims to dialogue with others; and to benefit from the knowledge and 
achievements of all cultures in order to improve the welfare of the Muslim 
community(Al Ansari, 1980). 
Advocates of al-Tawfikiyya supported the rejuvenation of the Islamic civilization 
at the mental, intellectual, socioeconomic and scientific levels. According to its 
critics, though, this openness contravened some basic Islamic principles and departed 
from the opinion of the community (al-jama‟a). Furthermore, those critics maintain 
that this flexible attitude toward Islam, that al-Tawfikiyya became associated with, 
opened the flood gates for the spread of secular thought throughout the Arab world. 
For those critics, it was not by coincidence that both al-Tawfikiyya (as a school of 
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thought) and secular Arab nationalist thought emanated from Egypt in the early part 
of the twentieth century.  
The secular movement in Egypt was initially represented by the magazine “al-
Moktataf” and the newspaper "al-Moqattam," as well as by its members Yaacoub 
Sarrouf, Shaheen Makarios and Gerji Zeidan (1861-1914). During this early period, 
though, the champions of secularism, whether in Egypt or the Levant, were primarily 
Christians who were educated at least in part in the West. Despite some limited 
notable exceptions (e.g. Lutfi al-Sayed, and Tawfic Hakim in Egypt) secular ideology 
has not yet penetrated the ranks of Muslim elites, to say nothing about the masses. 
Nevertheless, secularism was becoming a potent force in the region and a serious 
challenge to the hegemony of traditional Muslim thought (Al Ansari, 1980). 
The abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 represented another impetus to the 
development of the creed of Hizbut Tahrir. In brief, the party interpreted this move a 
major and unprecedented assault by the West and secular elements in Turkey on the 
Muslim Umma. That same year, the Cairo conference, failed to produce a new 
successor to the deposed Ottoman Sultan Abdul majid II who only ruled from 1922 
to1924.A possible candidate could have been King Fouad (b.1868- d.1936) of Egypt, 
but this did not materialize (Piscatori, 2006).   
A second conference was held two years later, in May 1926, in Cairo at al-Azhar 
University. Many scholars from the Muslim world attended, which proved this 
attempt to be more serious than previous conferences held and efforts made to restore 
the Khilafah. This second attempt, or what was known as the General Islamic 
Conference,  involved scholars and dignitaries from Syria, Morocco, Iraq, the Arabian 
Peninsula and India, as well as delegates from a few countries in Europe and South 
Africa. As a result of this conference and to better achieve the greater goal of 
26 
 
restoring the Islamic Umma -- headed by the Caliphate -- committees were formed 
and commissioned to confirm the necessity of restoring the caliphate in Islam and 
study and reflect upon the conditions, in Islam, that dictate the succession of the 
caliphate. 
The conference recognized the possibility of restoring the legitimate Islamic 
caliphate, suggesting that Muslims in the eastern world, as well as in the west, begin 
preparing the scene and means for reviving it. In order to achieve a successful 
conference, a large representation of all stakeholders in the restoration of the caliphate 
system was present. The conference attendants included prominent members of the 
Muslim community with a diverse body of Muslims being represented in a meeting in 
Cairo as delegates of various Muslim countries worked together on finding Islamic 
terms for the caliphate(Rida, 1926). 
Mohamad Rashid Rida (b.1865- d.1935), a prominent Lebanese Islamic thinker 
who wrote extensively on the principles of and the need for  an Islamic state, and who 
was a member of one of the sub-committees of the General Islamic Conference, wrote 
a  treatise which brought the concept of the caliphate closer to reality by suggesting 
that the social and intellectual elites play the role of problem solvers and advisors 
(Ahl el-Aked and Ahl el-Shoura) with regard to resolving the issues that may arise in 
the Umma. Rida‟s practical suggestions have heavily influenced and are reflected in 
al-Nabhani‟s theory on establishing the caliphate, which was written a quarter of a 
century later. Al-Nabhani was particularly moved by Rida‟s opinion on the elites. . He 
refuted the idea of a predominant caliphate and put restrictions on the caliph in order 
to prevent the caliph from abusing his power at the cost of the public. Rida, however, 
criticized the Ottoman state in his memoire, mentioning that it was not a legitimate 
succession, nor was it valid because it was a caliphate of defeat (Khilafat taghalob). 
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His vision for the ideal state was one where there is no oppressor and no victim. A 
just rule would be achieved if the reigns were passed over to the elites (Al Abyad, 
1993).  
2.4.2 Ideological Influences 
 
At the ideational level, the ideas of Hizbut-Tahrir represented a reaction to the spread 
of two ideologies to the Arab world; Marxism and Arab nationalism. In the first part 
of the 20
th
 century, Marxism represented an important, albeit not an existentialist, 
threat to the hegemony of Islamic thought in the Arab world. Marxist ideas began to 
creep into the Arab and Muslim world shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia in 1917(Roy, 2004). As with secular ideologies (e.g. nationalism), the initial 
advocates of Marxian thought in the region were non-Muslims. This is not to deny 
that some Muslim thinkers (such as in Sudan) were swayed by Marxian thought and 
did not see Marxism as contradicting the basic teachings of Islam. What lured a 
minority in the Arab world to Marxian thought was its revolutionary potential, 
opposition to western imperialism and its alleged status as a scientific approach to 
analyzing society and its promise of eradicating serious and endemic problems, 
primarily: poverty, backwardness and utter dependence on the West (Rodinson, 
1979). 
At a later stage, socialist and communist parties began to spread in the Arab 
world. The Egyptian Communist Party was founded in 1922, and other parties 
followed suit. Ahmed Refaat translated into Arabic the first Marxian works -- namely: 
V.I. Lenin‟s State and Revolution. The Syrian intellectual Khaled Bikdash (1912-
1995) translated the Communist Manifesto in 1933. The inroads that Marxism made 
into the Arab world remained quite limited. The appeal of this ideology did not spread 
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to the masses -- except in limited geographic areas; e.g. some sections of Iraq and 
Sudan (Abdul Hakim, 1962).  
On the contrary, Arab nationalist thought, which from the outset presented itself 
as indigenous (rather than European inspired), caught fire with large sections of the 
Arab elites and masses alike. Some Arab researchers believe that Mohamad Ali 
Pasha‟s rule in Egypt between 1805 and 1847, and his reform activities as well as the 
expansion in the Levant, Sudan and the Arabian Peninsula is the first unitary work in 
Arab modern history.  
Mohammad Ali Pasha‟s dreams of unity collided with the European colonial 
invasion of Arab countries: France occupied Algeria in 1830, Britain rushed to control 
the island of Sumatra as well as Aden in 1834, and many other Arabic countries were 
stripped from the Ottoman Empire. The Christian missionaries who had infiltrated 
some of these countries stepped up in preparation for the colonial movement through 
the dissemination of language teaching and cultural activities as well as humanitarian 
aid, taking advantage of the facilities granted to them, especially in the era of Ibrahim 
Pasha. Among the intellectuals who emerged in cultural forums at the time were Nasif 
al Yaziji (b.1800 - d.1871), Adel Arslan (b.1887 - d.1954) and Botrous al-Bustani 
(b.1819 – d.1883). This activism led to authoring encyclopedias, publishing 
newspapers and writing books. Thus, two essential forces emerged in Lebanon in 
support of the Arabic mission, a French force and an American force, and both helped 
support the Arabic Ba‟ath (Geddes, 1981). 
Following the conflict between the so-called methodology (almanhajiyah 
alTawfikiyya), European secularism and Islamic fundamentalism, the force and 
technology gained power and control on the ground due to their colonial power. As a 
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result, Egypt was occupied in 1882, the French and British gained full control over 
the Levant in 1918 and the Caliphate was abolished in 1924.  
This is how the West was directly able to govern the Levant, by dominating 
through its administrative and political approaches, as well as through its 
methodology in economics and civism, and by gearing the region into following its 
global capitalist cycle. This European dominance consisted of exporting raw material, 
relying on the Levant as a consuming market for European products, and using the 
region as a strategic corridor for its trade routes. Strongly and vigorously, western 
cultural influences began permeating to Arab societies.  
While opinions differ on the reasons behind the emergence and spread of Arab 
nationalist thought, it is evident that its proponents could appeal to broad sections of 
the Arab public. This appeal stemmed from the population‟s disenchantment with the 
Ottoman era, which had produced little development in the Arab world, and its 
vehement opposition to the preservation of the colonial system, even if under new 
guises. Arab nationalists (unlike Arab liberals) advocated severing ties with the 
colonial west, were open to socialist ideas, and above all adopted a benign attitude 
toward Islam. Through accommodating their ideology to Islam and avoiding any 
direct assault on its tenets, Arab nationalists were able to draw support from many 
observant Muslims. Moreover, the most ardent champions of Arab nationalism in the 
second part of the twentieth century were devout Muslims. Jamal Abdel Nasser was 
arguably the prime manifestation of this conciliation between Arab nationalism and 
Islam; although there are many other examples at least at the level of rhetoric (such as 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq (Tibi, 1997). 
Critics of Arab nationalism, nevertheless, point to its European origins. In support 
of their viewpoint, they emphasize that Arab nationalists adopt a western construal of 
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the Umma which emphasizes language, common history and culture as the bases of 
the Umma rather than religion per se. The nationalist understanding of the Umma is 
fundamentally at odds with the Islamic perspective of the Umma. Al-Nabhani and 
other Islamic figures were undoubtedly unimpressed by Arab nationalism (Roy, 
2004). 
2.4.3 Other Influences 
 
As aforementioned, Taqiuddin Al-Nabhani was highly influenced by his 
grandfather Sheikh Yusuf al-Nabhani. Al-Nabhani acknowledges his debt to his 
grandfather; highlighting how he benefited from his plentiful knowledge, and took on 
political law cases that his grandfather was familiar with through his close contact 
with people in the Ottoman state. His grandfather had a significant role in persuading 
Taqiuddin‟s father to send him to al-Azhar in order to continue his education. And 
due to the old school system that used to allow it, Taqiuddin was able to attend 
religious seminars at al-Azhar given by Sheikhs his grandfather had personally 
recommended(Zarakli, 1992).The most prominent of them was Sheikh Mohamad al-
Khodor Hussein (b. 1876 - . 1958), who was an Islamic thinker of some renown.  
As al-Nabhani came under the influence of this religious scholar, a brief 
discussion of Sheikh Mohamad al-Khodor Hussein‟s life and achievements will 
ensue. Hussein is of Algerian origins (of Hasani or Husseini descent, according to and 
his lineage is traced back to al-Adarisa of Morocco (which is a large and prestigious 
family fromAl-Maghreb al-Arabi).He was born in Tunisia, and was influenced by his 
maternal uncle Mohamad al-Makki, a senior scholar of his time and respectable 
among people in the Ottoman Empire.  
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Al-Khodor‟s education began at al-Zaytuna Mosque in Tunisia where he received 
a degree in Shari‟a, and then founded the magazine "al-Sa‟ada al-Ozma" (The Great 
Happiness)upon graduation in 1903. He was elected governor of Bizerte, and when 
Italy invaded Libya in 1911, he called upon the Umma and the Ottoman Empire for 
support through his magazine. He lived in Istanbul for a period of time working as an 
editor for the minister of war Anwar Pasha. In 1916, al-Khodor Hussein was arrested 
in Damascus by Jamal Pasha, and then upon his release returned to Istanbul. . In 1920, 
following the end of the World War I, he returned to Damascus when Syria came to 
be ruled by Prince Faisal ibn al-Hussein. He later settled in Cairo in 1921 and began 
his scholarly production, and in 1924 he founded the association "Taawon Jaliyat 
Afriqia al-Shamaliyyah,” (The Cooperation of the Communities of North Africa). 
Sheikh Hussein fought a major intellectual battle in a response to Taha Hussein‟s 
book on Jahili poetry through a critique entitled "Naqed Kitab fil She‟er el-
Jahili.”(The Critique of a Book of Jahili Poetry). 
In 1951, he became a member of the council of senior Muslim scholars, and in 
1952 he became the head sheikh at al-Azhar. Sheikh Hussein responded to the book 
“al-Islam wa Usul el-Hokom” (Islam and the Principles of Rule) which was written 
by Sheikh Ali Abdul Razzaq, one of the most renowned sheikhs at al-Azhar. This 
book was one of the boldest attempts to justify the termination of the Ottoman 
caliphate; and the need to close the chapter of its return. Therefore al Nabhani 
benefited from Hussein‟s book and agrees with its criticism of banning the return of 
the caliphate as this return to the caliphate state is the core mission of the party he 
would establish. Sheikh Hussein spent his last days in al-Astana (known as Istanbul 
today) at the request of Sultan Abdul Hamid (Alaywan, 2009). 
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2.4.4 Overview of Hizbut-Tahrir’s Presence Globally 
 
Hizabut-Tahrir has a considerable presence in many nations of both the western 
and Islamic world. It claims to have branches in at least 45 nations stretching from 
Asia to the United States.Moreover, the internet age has allowed easy access to the 
party‟s online literature for anyone who is interest or contemplating to join the party. 
This has spiked the number of party members and aided in its expansion.The easy 
access has also facilitated the spread of the party to countries such as Australia, 
Belgium, Denmark, Malaysia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Bangladesh. Still, in many 
nations of both east and west, the party faces a high level of animosity regarding its 
presence and operation in these nations (“Western Fears of the Spread of Hizbut 
Tahrir,” 2013). 
The political leadership of the party on the global spectrum dictates that one 
leader rules over all the party‟s branches or wilayat. The leader is elected through an 
internal process and has no terminal election term. In other words, the ruler continues 
to rule until his death or in the case of resignation (Abou Zahab, 2004). 
This chapter offered an exposé of the various individuals and events that shaped 
Sheikh al-Nabhani‟s political thoughts. It started out by mapping the significance of 
his family background in introducing him to Islam and went on to shed light on two 
notable individuals -- sheikh Mohamad al Khodr Hussein and Hajj  Mohamad Amin 
al-Husseini – who influenced his thought. The chapter also offered insight on various 
ideologies – Marxism and Arab nationalism – and their role and contribution to al-
Nabhani‟s personal ideologies. Furthermore the chapter introduced some of the 
historical background (e.g. the siege of Palestine and the Arab‟s betrayal of that 
cause) that was also significant to his political development. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
 
An Overview of Hizbut – Tahrir in Lebanon 
 
 
 
This chapter condenses considerable material in trying to present an overview of the 
evolution of Hizbut Tahrir activities in Lebanon. It goes on to address the party‟s 
relationship with various other Islamic movements. These include: Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Salafi movement represented by Al Haraka al Salafiya fi Lubran 
headed by Sheikh Da‟I al islam al Chahal, and the Association for Islamic Charitable 
Projects (Al Ahbash) as well as the relationship with Hezbollah. Furthermore, the 
chapter analyzesHizbut tahrir‟s understanding of the Lebanese social and political 
system. 
3.1 The Rise of Hizbut-Tahrir in Lebanon 
 
As previously noted Sheikh al-Nabhani settled in Lebanon as of 1956. This long 
stay in one country enabled him to lay the foundations of his party in a relatively 
receptive environment. According to Hizbut – Tahrir, the nature of Lebanon, as well 
as its political and demographic structure do not allow the establishment of an Islamic 
state on its territories.That is why the party in Lebanon is actively working on 
preparing an infrastructure to make this geographic spot an integral part of the long-
sought Islamic state. Because it considers that Lebanon is part of the Islamic world 
that was unfairly separated from the historic bilad-alsham, Hizbut- Tahrir mainly 
wanted to deliver the message to Muslims that they should give their allegiance to 
Lebanon; instead, the loyalty should be to the Islamic Umma as a whole. This was the 
principal point on which the party was founded in Lebanon. In fact, its main objective 
is to prepare Lebanese people and habilitate them to become part of the broader 
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movement of the Umma as a whole. Moreover Lebanon stands out in the region as a 
platform for freedom of speech. This could be used in the party‟s favor, as it allows it 
to deliver the voice of the party whereas it had not been able to do so in the regional 
milieu (Alloush, 2011). 
The history of Hizbut – Tahrir in Lebanon goes back to the early days of founding 
the party in Palestine. The restrictions imposed by the Jordanian authorities on the 
party activities in Jerusalem and its environs as well as the arrest of some of its 
founders, forced the party founder to move to Syria where he also faced objections 
and rejection for his party‟s activities. Therefore the party moved most of its activities 
to Lebanon in 1953. The founding Sheikh went on to spend most of the remainder of 
his life – some 25 years -- in Lebanon. In fact, when he settled in Lebanon, al-
Nabhani started to work on founding a local chapter of the party. Between 1958 and 
1959 an official framework was formed and the party applied for appraisal and 
notification from the Lebanese authorities and notified the Ministry of Interior of its 
intent to commence its operation
5
.  
Accordingly the party acted considered itself legally licensed, after the year 1959, 
however this did not last for long. In 1961 and in reaction to the failed coup attempt 
by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Lebanese authorities banned the 
SSNP. This also prompted a ban on Hizzbut- Tahrir, whose members were always 
persecuted by the state security systems, anyway. At the height of the Chehabist 
period (1958-1964), the Lebanese authorities closely monitored all the party‟s 
activities. Such activities included distributing publications and holding of gatherings 
in the streets and the mosques which were platforms for projecting the party‟s views. 
                                                     
5
According to Lebanese laws, the government should issue the license within fourty days of 
application. In case the government does not issue the license nor reject it in the allocated time, the 
license is still granted. 
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Several party members were subjected to imprisonment with such rigor that even 
Sheikh Al- Nabhani himself became wanted, and this prompted him to move from 
Beirut to Tripoli where he remained undercover for the rest of his life (Chami, 2003).  
The party tried to engage in the political process through fielding candidates who 
were not chased after by the security agencies. In 1964, Youssef Baadarani (still alive 
to the date of writing) ran as an electoral candidate for the parliamentary elections in 
Beirut. Baadarani was a prominent follower of Sheikh Al- Nabhani, and during his 
electoral campaign, he was pressured by the state authoritieswho fought against him 
and restricted him, so he couldn‟t succeed at that time. Later that same year (1964), 
the party nominated Sheikh Othman Safi to run in the parliamentary elections in 
Tripoli. In brief, the party participatedin several parliamentary elections, through 
candidates that it thought would be acceptable to the authorities, but failed to win any 
seats(Ghanem, 1983).  
When the Lebanese Civil War erupted in 1975, the party did not participate in any 
armed conflict nor did it join any political group or militia. Some individual members 
of the party, however, did take up weapons for purposes of self-defense. All 
throughout the war, the party didn‟t have any public headquarters or center. It wasn‟t 
until 2006 that it established a library in the Mazraa district of Beirut this library, 
however, wasn‟t an official center, but a gathering place for the party‟s youth. 
When the Syrian Army entered Lebanon, it began persecuting the party‟s youth. 
In this, it was assisted by the Lebanese security forces. Party members were targeted 
when they distributed publications
6
 or the gathered after Friday prayers. These 
publications, whichreflected the party‟s attitude toward the Lebanese actualities, were 
                                                     
6
 It is worth noting here that the party issues two types of publications: local ones that pertain to 
Lebanon‟s wilaya and which are locally circulated under the name of Hizbut–Tahrir – Wilayat Lubnan 
and international ones which hold global message for a global audience.  
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distributed anywhere in the world where Hizbut-Tahrir was present.These 
publications are written by thefounders of the party. According to party officials, the 
Syrian regime considers Hizbut- Tahrir among the most dangerous parties, and claims 
that its youth used to be arrested on the Lebanese territories before being taken back 
to the Syrian prisons for interrogation (Al Markaz Al Arabi, 2006). 
In the ideology of Hizbut – Tahrir the armies of Arab states are not considered as 
enemies per se.  When the Syrian army entered Lebanon in 1976, Hizbut-Tahrir did 
not join other Islamic and leftist movement in opposing Syrian military intervention. 
Source .Thus, there are no documented cases of party members attacking or harassing 
Syrian troops. This stance also applies to the Lebanese army. The party has chosen to 
avoid armed conflict with it. This principle can be contrasted to that of Salafi Islamic 
movements that consider national armies to be instruments of Kufr states and thus 
legitimate targets for attack. Further proving their lack of interest in violent strifewith 
the Syrian troops is the fact that although Hizbut –Tahrir was subject to a lot of 
hostility, when the Syrian troops entered Tripoli,in 1976,the party members did not 
confront them militarily. They also maintained a pacifist attitude when Syrian forces 
heavily shelled Tripoli in the late 1980s
7
. 
 Even in the core of the Syrian revolution (which will be further elaborate on in 
chapter four), the party kept -- at the beginning --on warning against aiming at the 
Syrian army, until the army started using violence , which made the party vindicate 
self-defense as a right of the people. Overall, the party considers that during the 
Syrian era, the Syrian and Lebanese security systems cooperated and jointly 
performed hostile acts against the party and its members (Itani, 2008). 
                                                     
7
 Syria reentered Tripoli in 1985 to eradicate the unified Muslim movement (Harakat al Tawheed al 
Islami) among other reasons. In 1986, Syrian forces committed a massacre of 700 people in Tripoli, 
known as Bab el Tebeneh Massacre.  
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 With time, the youth of Hizbut – Tahrir adopted a different trend toward the 
Syrian – Lebanese security system. At the end of the 1990s, the party was facing 
multiple arrests, and by the year 2000, the majority of people affiliated to Hizbut- 
Tahrir were arrested. More recently however, the party has stepped up its challenge of 
the system (Hizbut Tahrir - Wilayat Lubnan, 2008). 
3.2 Hizbut-Tahrir and the relation with Hezbollah 
 
Hizbut-Tahrir‟s stances towards Hezbollah are fraught with certain ambiguities 
and even inconsistencies. Thus, while the Party of Liberation considers Hezbollah to 
be implicitly associated with US policies, it supports Hezbollah‟s struggle against the 
common enemy: the state of Israel. Ideologically speaking, the two parties subscribe 
to alternative, even clashing, modes of Islamic government. Hezbollah is known to 
support the Shiite-based doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih (Rule of the Jurisprudent), while 
Hizbut-Tahrir‟s supports the Caliphate. Hizbut-Tahrir is also weary of Hezbollah‟s 
close religious and political ties to Iran (Jaber, 2011). 
More so, Hezbollah is fiercely assaulted by Hizbut Tahrir on social media sites in 
such a way that it calls it “Iran party” or “Iran militia.” Hizbut -Tahrir considers 
Hezbollah involved in an American- Iranian plan working to compromise Arab 
activity -- mainly through what‟s happening in Syria. According to the party, the 
objective behind Hezbollah is the predominance of the Persian Shiite Iran over 
Lebanon. Whether they admit it or not, the Iranians are serving US politics in the 
region, whereby Iran and the US have the same objective which is to prevent any 
possibility of a Sunnite Islamic rise and to repulse the victory of the Syrian revolution 
(Abedin, 2009). 
 In 2012, Hezbollah tried to get in contact with Hizbut Tahrir and meet with its 
party members. This invitation was rejected by Hizbut Tahrir which demanded that 
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Hezbollah changes its attitude toward what is happening in Syria before any meeting 
would be possible. Some eminent figures in Hizbut Tahrir declare in 2012, Hezbollah 
kidnapped a young man from Hizbut - Tahrir in the southern suburb of Beirut. At that 
time, one young man of Al Mikdad family was kidnapped in Syria one year ago, as a 
reaction to the kidnapping performed by Hezbollah. The kidnapped man appeared in 
the media stating that he is affiliated with Hizbut - Tahrir, which triggered the party to 
consider itself targeted. In June 2013, Hezbollah members broke into houses and 
shops belonging to Hizbut - Tahrir activists in Beirut‟s southern suburb, even though 
those shops existed before Hezbollah‟s establishment in Lebanon(Shalha, 2012). 
According to Hizbut -Tahrir, the Resistance of Hezbollah to Israel will remain 
ineffective unless Hezbollah extends its hand to other players. The right path to 
liberating Palestine is to wage a collective war led by the Umma as a whole and not 
by individuals or collectivities linked to some political systems. Hizbut - Tahrir 
considers that those who are protecting the Jews in Palestine are the regimes 
surrounding it and that the way to free Palestine is to overthrow, even one system 
among these so Al Jihad‟s path will be open to free Palestine. Another example that 
shows the uselessness of fragmented opposition to Israel is the Fedayeen. Hizbut – 
Tahrir considers that the fighting and the Fedaeyeen operations that were launched 
against Israel in the early 1970s and that were supported by the regional regimes with 
the purpose of serving Israel and making peace with it to reach the global of 
settlement is not the right way to combat Zionism (Abu Al Rashta, 2008).   
3.3 Hizbut-Tahrir and the Political Activism in Lebanon during the 
Syrian Presence 
 
      In the beginning of year 2001, the political milieu -- including some Islamic 
movements and Sheiks -- started enjoying political work under the umbrella of the 
39 
 
Syrian- Lebanese security system; whereas any activity undertaken by the political 
systems and the Islamic movements was subject to the control and demanded prior 
approval from the security centers. This motivated Hizbut-Tahrir to breach this 
customand thus began its political struggle against the government systems by 
distributing circulars that challenge the state systems and their political decisions. The 
party figures also used to gather in the mosques and give speeches explicitly opposing 
the security systems, and this went on despite the daily arrests of the party‟s youth in 
such a way that the number of arrested members at times exceeded two hundred, 
while the Lebanese judicial authorities were lacking for any data and information to 
try those young men. This led to their being detained for months and years without 
trials. 
These arrests didn‟t de-motivate the party, on the contrary it incited it to proceed 
in its activity and to draw more public attention and gain huge media coverage. The 
party was indifferent to the offers made by the security systems to cooperate with 
them – offers that promised the security system would loosen its grip on the party and 
stop arresting its members. For instance the party‟s media officer in Lebanon, Ahmad 
Al Kasas, was arrested and jailed for six months due to his political affiliations and 
his positions against the security systems. During his detainment in 2004, Al Kasas, 
who has been affiliated with the party since 1984, states that the work team linked 
directly to Sheikh Taquiddin al Nabhani was the most confidential team and its 
members′ identities shall remain unrevealed. He leaked no information during his 
time in prison (A. Al Kasas, personal communication, January 27, 2014). 
Ahmad al-Kasas and a group of the party‟s youthestablished a cultural association 
called Rabitat Al Wai′i Al Sakafi (The Association for Cultural Awakening) in 1994. 
Its purpose was to target the public; and it was located in Al Mitain Street in Tripoli. 
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The association was licensed in the same year by the Lebanese Ministry of Interior. It 
held intensive activities such as conferences, seminars, university activities, 
televisionbroadcasts and booklets. Among the founders of this association was 
Waleed Dernaika, the chief (moukhtar) of Haddadeene district in Tripoli. The 
association performed a cultural role, whilst still spreading political content.Several 
people from both genders took part in these activities. In 2004, the association was 
heavily restricted which led to the arrest of Ahmad Al Kasas. It was well known to the 
security systems then that the association is linked to Hizbut- Tahrir because although 
its activities were restricted to culture, it had a challenging intellectual and political 
aspect to it. As for the party in Lebanon, it does not have a particular program for 
Lebanon, but it is a global party all over the world and has one methodology and one 
plan distributed over its provinces in the countries where the party exists under what 
is called “Wilayat.”    
In 2004, Hizbut- Tahrir organized its first public demonstration in front of the Big 
Mosque in Tripoli, aiming at protesting against Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Alawi‟s 
visit because he was the head of the American occupation government in Iraq. The 
party considered the demonstration crucial especially because all the Lebanese 
political forces, including Hezbollah, remained silent toward this visit. The party 
considers that these demonstrations aimed at showing the public that it will take the 
efforts of an entire Umma to defeat these tyrannical regimes and overthrow the Arab 
rulers who are the leaders of the regimes of atheism, despotism and subordination (A. 
Al Kasas, personal communication, January 27, 2014). 
In the same year, some main figures of the party‟s media central office raised their 
voices which prompted their arrest. These included the engineer Othman Bakhash 
from Beirut and Dr. Ayman Al Kaderi from Bekaa. Both were arrested, followed then 
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by Ahmad Al Kasas who was also arrested despite his rise as president for “Al Wai‟i 
Al Sakafi” association. Everyone was arrested after the demonstration that was held in 
the big mosque in Tripoli, even though Al Kasas didn‟t even participate in the 
demonstration. Before his arrestment, Al Kasas was prohibited from participating in 
TV shows broadcasted on Al Jazeera sat, such as (Al Ittijah Al Moua‟akess) and ( Al 
Sharia‟a wal Hayat) shows, but the security systems were surprised to see that Al 
Kasas appeared in the show live from Beirut. On the show, he talked about the 
circumstances behind his arrestment in Tripoli when the security systems ambushed 
and kidnapped him at Bab Al Raml locality in Tripoli before taking him to Al Kobbe 
barracks then to Al Yarze (the headquarters of the Lebanese ministry of defense) 
where --, according to his statements -- he was hit and tortured during investigation. 
The investigation was focused on the relation of “Al Wai‟i Al Sakafi” union with 
Hizbut Tahrir and the ways of funding this union and if it was being financially 
supported by Hizbut Tahrir. Meanwhile, multiple bodies issued communiqués 
condemning his arrestment, notable among them is the Secondary Teaching 
Instructors Union, since Al Kasas used to work as an instructor in the secondary 
cycle, in addition to a communiqué issued by the party of “Al Jama‟a Al Islamiya,” 
“Al Tawhid” Islamic movement and “Al Rawabet Al Chaa‟biya” committees which 
are presided by Maan Bachour. Moreover, pictures of Al Kasas were posted in Tripoli 
demanding his release. These posters, however, were immediately removed at the 
instruction of the security systems. According to Al Kasas‟s statement: “Upon the 
recommendation of Waleed Junblat, the head of the progressive socialist party (PSP), 
Bakhach and Al Kasas were released and judged innocent,”(A. Al Kasas, personal 
communication, January 27, 2014). 
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3.4 Hizbut –Tahrir’s Critique of Lebanese Democracy 
 
The party considers that Lebanon, despite its claims to be a democratic country, is 
full of contradictions regarding the law of media freedom, which often-times conflicts 
the oppressing security system. The party considers Lebanese democracy to be 
superficial or even a sham. According to party rhetoric, successive Lebanese 
governments didn‟t show openness to Hizbut- Tahrir except for a few years after the 
assassination of Rafik Hariri; and in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the Syrian 
forces from Lebanon. However, according to the party, Lebanon is today living under 
an oppressive security system with rare media coverage (through the papers, 
television, radio) of party activities, because the security system and under western 
and American directives, issued warnings against any media outlet‟s coverageof the 
party‟s activities (Zalloum, 1990). Accordingly, it was difficult for Hizbut - Tahrir 
leaders to have access to media, notably on the Lebanese platforms. Even the 
allegedly large demonstrations organized by the party were barely covered by the 
media and some media people conspired against Hizbut Tahrir and claimed that it was 
supporting Ahmad Al Assir‟s movement in Sida and performing acts of sabotage. 
According to Ahmad Al Kasas, a party activist from the north with extensive 
knowledge of party operations, the party did not take part in the fighting in Tripoli 
thus refuting media allegations. Al Kasas further notes that the party does not 
condone protests that turn violent and lead to clashes with security and threaten 
civilian life and property. The same source draws a distinction between the peaceful 
demonstrations that the party organizes (especially in the district of Al Tal square vs. 
the less orderly demonstrations in Abdul Hamid square which the party does not 
participate in nor support). In a nutshell, party sources emphasize the continued 
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reliance of the party on peaceful means of propagating its message and its refusal to 
be drawn by violent, and often, sectarian clashes.  
Al Kasas denounced media coverage of the party claiming that it was biased and 
aimed at discrediting the party by portraying it as fanatic in its ideology and 
comprising of narrow-minded individuals who have superficial understanding of 
Islam. He further alleged that the media are in league with the security forces 
coordinating their efforts to lure people away from Hizbul – Tahrir. For instance, 
LBCI broadcasted a TV report stating that Hizbut-Tahrir is involved in the fighting in 
triploi and that some of its members are involved in the sectarian clashes and the 
confrontations with the security forces. Another Lebanese station MTV station as well 
mentioned that there was an assault against journalists during Hizbut-Tahrir 
demonstrations.  
Such media allegations are the reason why Al Kasas considers that most of the 
Lebanese mass media want to show the party as a narrow-minded, fanatic, religious 
supporter of everything outlaw According to Al Kasas, the media is conspiring with 
the security systems to defame the party‟s image. Furthermore, OTV station asked Al 
Kasas to prepare a report about the party, but he conditioned them to have a live show 
to prevent the TV station from altering and reformulating his report. Al Kasas 
considers that the Lebanese media shows some figures and focuses on some 
movements' representatives working under the name of Islamic titles, however this 
only represents a small fraction of the Islamic community; he cites as an example 
Omar Bakri, Bilal Dekmak and others. Because Hizbut- Tahrir is among the leading 
parties within the Islamic community, Al Kasas considers that it faces fierce media 
opposition (A. Al Kasas, personal communication, January 27, 2014). 
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Hizbut-Tahrir‟s operation after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon: Upon the 
withdrawal of the Syrian armies from Lebanon, the Lebanese security systems 
agencies continued to pursue and arrest the party‟s youth. In 2005, under the reign of 
the Prime Minister Fouad Al Sanioura, the ministerial council promulgated a decree 
announcing the possibility to found political parties without its consent. This occurred 
at the request of Parliament member Ghassan Moukhayber who used to be a member 
in the front of the MP Michel Aoun. Ironically, however, his political party was 
against issuing a permit for Hizbut - Tahrir. 
Accordingly, Hizbut - Tahrir applied for “ilm wa khabar”appraisal and 
notification”Need better translation in 2005 when Ahmad Fatfat was the minister of 
the interior by delegation, and the authorization was therefore granted. During that 
time, Hizbut - Tahrir made shuttle visits to all the leaders and political parties without 
any differentiation between the parties of 8 and 14 March. This was prior to the 
notification's signature by the ministry of the interior. The visits included a one to 
Fatfat and it was a protocol visit to introduce the party‟s representatives in Lebanon. 
During that visit, the two parties shared a mutual opinion regarding the performance 
of the state intelligence which created tensions between Fatfat and the security 
systems. According to the party, Fatfat facilitated, through the army, the release of 
some of the party‟s youth who had been arrested for distributing publications for an 
unauthorized party. It is worth noting that many eminent figures of the Future 
movement, at that time, objected to the authorization of Hizbut - Tahrir. 
To this day, the party‟s affiliates are still following up their cases in the military 
judicial authorities, including Ahmad Al Kasas and Dr. Mohamad Jaber who are 
accused of offending the military institution and the Maronite Patriarch. It is evident 
with each attempt that the pressure that is put against the party is based on the 
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recommendation of the security systems in the US embassy -- according to the 
statements of Ahmad al Kasas, the media representative of the party in Lebanon (A. 
Al Kasas, personal communication, January 27, 2014). 
In the year 2010, the agenda of the ministerial council included a decision to ban 
Hizbut Tahrir activities; however, this decision was removed before the opening 
session. This removal is justified by the party with the close relations that blossomed 
between then Prime minister, Saad Hariri and the Syrian regime at that stage. 
However the political and the security situation, including the Sunni- Shiite conflict 
that affected the Lebanese arena at that time, didn‟t allow for the taking of such a 
decision. The party is so far taking precautionary measures against the Lebanese 
authorities justifying that by the fact that Hezbollah is the ally of the Syrian regime, 
therefore, taking possession of all the Lebanese state's important utilities as well as 
the judicial and security institutions including the Intelligence. Furthermore, some of 
the main political players in Lebanon, such as president Nabih Berri and the free 
national movement, refused to meet with the party‟s leaders, even though the party 
had a meeting before July war in the year 2006, with Hassan Nasrallah the general 
secretary of Hezbollah, when they had the opportunity to express their objection 
against the party‟s relation with the Syrian regime and with Iran -- especially because 
Iran isn‟t an Arabic Islamic nation, but a Persian nation(A. Al Kasas, personal 
communication, January 27, 2014). 
Although Hizbut- Tahrir interacts with most of the parties and movements in 
Lebanon, it is boycotting the Lebanese forces party because it considers that this party 
has a dark criminal past mainly due to its involvement in former Prime Minister 
Rachid Karami‟s murder. As for running for the parliamentary elections, it is eligible, 
provided that the party does not constitute a part of the Lebanese politics or the 
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Lebanese system, but the candidate of the party shall be elected by the people to 
express the electoral program that includes the project of establishing the caliphate; 
whereas the elector refuses the current constitution so he doesn‟t endorse the 
government nor elect a president for the republic or endorse the budget of the state. It 
also subjugates the state to accountability, based on the Islamic law (Sharia) and not 
on the constitution. This is a brief part of the electoral program sponsored by the 
candidate of Hizbut Tahrir Youssef Baadarani who ran for Beirut and sheikh Othman 
Safi who ran for Tripoli, in the sixties (A. Al Kasas, personal communication, January 
27, 2014). 
During elections in the year 2005, the party examined the possibility of running 
for the parliamentary elections, but found it unnecessary to do so due to several 
reasons -- mainly that the elections at that stage were affected by strong political 
polarizations and there was no appropriate climate for the people to listen to electoral 
programs and campaigns. All categories were polarized in favor of the Sunnis, Shiites 
or any of the other confessions. However this didn‟t prevent some of the party‟s 
activists from running for the local elections whereby some of them were elected as 
chiefs (mukhtars). The party had a mukhtar in Haddadeene (a locality in Tripoli): 
Waleed Dernaika who got 3000 votes. He, however, had run individually and not 
based on the party‟s decision. According to the party, these electoral proceedings 
don't aim at making the party part of the Lebanese political system, but aims at 
emphasizing a party‟s figure that offers a new model of the political work, where the 
state is held accountable based on the Islamic religious provisions. The party does not 
aspire to form one day part of the political system neither in Lebanon nor anywhere 
else; as this is considered prohibited by the Islamic religious law. Hizbut Tahrir 
considers running only for the parliamentary or local elections, without reaching a 
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ministerial or political position (which means the executive authority)(A. Al Kasas, 
personal communication, January 27, 2014). 
3.5 Hizbut-Tahrir and other Islamic Movements 
 
Hizbut – Tahrir has established a distinct platform for itself, but it continues to coexist 
and cooperate with various other Islamic parties in the region despite the presence of 
large discrepancies among them in their understanding of Islam and their 
interpretation of the Islamic Umma. As an Islamic movement, it is interesting to place 
Hizbut-Tahrir‟s ideology in parallel with other regional Islamic movements. When 
compared with (Al Ahbach), the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Wahhabists, many 
noteworthy contradictions arise. 
3.5.1 Hizbut – Tahrir and the Islamic Charitable Projects Association (Al 
Ahbach) 
 
The media officer in Hizbut Tahrir, Ahmad Al Kasas, sees that the party‟s 
members and the other Islamic movements deal with each other as brothers. However, 
when dealing with each other as collectivities, it is only a relationship of discussions, 
deliberations and mutual exchange of advice. Sometimes they coordinate together, but 
in a limited way. For instance, a few months ago, the party called for a demonstration 
in Beirut‟s downtown, where the party participated and coordinated with a number of 
Islamic bodies except for the Islamic Charitable Projects Association (Al Ahbach), 
because the party considers it subordinated to the Syrian security systems and devoid 
from any Islamic political activity (Salmani, 2012). 
Hizbut-Tahrir and some of the other Islamic movements have glaring disputes 
regarding many key points in their respective religious ideologies. For instance, Al 
Ahbach, who mention this in their writings, consider Hizbut-Tahrir to be disbelievers. 
Moreover, (Al Ahbach) accused(takfir) Ibn Taymiyya and Sayed Qutb of being 
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disbelievers, which makes it very easy for them to attribute disbelief to anyone. 
Hizbut-Tahrir considers all Al Ahbach‟s accusations to be false and not linked at all 
with the party‟s real principles and beliefs. The gap between the two parties doesn‟t 
end there, for Hizbut-Tahrir refuses the idea of torture of the grave (masaalat azab al 
kabr) which dictates that after death the sinner experiences physical bodily pain after 
his soul is separated from his body. If indeed he/she was a sinner, that person 
experiences extreme measures of pain; the intensity of the pain is determined by how 
sinful that person had been. Another quintessential point on which the two parties 
disagree is the false messiah (al masih al dajjal). The false messiah is one of the signs 
of the coming apocalypse (end of the world) and will be manifested in the incarnate of 
Iblis on earth as a man with gruesome features (A. Kara-ali, personal communication, 
January 29, 2014). Hizbut-Tahrir again refuses such a concept.  
The idea of free will is also disputed between Hizbut-Tahrir and Al Ahbach. 
While the former believes that man is his own master, the latter says that Allah 
ordains that all human action is preconceived.  The contradiction of opinions is 
evident when Nabhani says in his book (The Islamic Character): “And these actions – 
human actions – have nothing to do with fate.” In the same book, al Nabhani explains 
that when someone repents or decides to walk a straight path (al hidaya) it is a 
personal decision and not an act of God(Al Nabhani, 2001).  According to Al Ahbach, 
al Nabhani‟s views contradict both the Quran and the sayings of Prophet Mohamad 
(Hadith). They continue to quote from the Quran: “He has created each thing and 
determined it with [precise] determination,” (Quran: 25:2). Furthermore, the Quran 
says: “Allah has created you and what you do,” (Quran: 37:96). This last Quranic 
verse encompasses all bodies and movements of worship whether it was volitional or 
imposed.  
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3.5.2 Hizbut – Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood 
 
Initially, the Muslim Brotherhood was the sole reference for al Nabhani in his 
earliest political ventures. This was, in part, because at the time the Muslim 
Brotherhood was the only Islamic model available to al Nabhani. After the 
brotherhood was faced with a series of setbacks and obstacles – culminating in the 
assassination of Hasan al Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyed 
Qutb
8
took over operation of the party. During Qutb‟s reign, al Nabhani and the 
Muslim brotherhood found some common ground. The brotherhood regards al 
Nabhani as a worthy opponent because although al Nabhani contradicts the 
brotherhood on some ideas, they appreciate the quality of this thought. What brought 
the two closer is the similar organizational and political trends they exercised even 
though they operated on different visions for restoring the Caliphate. For instance the 
brotherhood does concur to the importance of restoring the caliphate, but limits its 
approach to this topic as something to strive for in the long-term. Al Nabhani, on the 
other hand, has made the return of the caliphate a fundamental issue upon which upon 
which his entire party is based (Ayoob, 2008). Withthe unofficial competition raging 
on between al Nabhani and Qutb, one can attest to the similarity of thought between 
the two which could not translate into political repulsion (Toth, 2013). Hizbut-Tahrir 
denies any remote influence of Qutb on al Nabhani; in fact al Nabhani claims that: 
“Sayyed Qutb used to advise his followers to consult read al Nabhani‟s book entitled 
“The Party‟s agglomeration” (Al takattol al hizbi). Al Nabhani considers that Qutb‟s 
last book, “Milestones on the Road” (Maalem fi al tareeq), is the Muslim 
                                                     
8
Sayyed Qutb (b.1906 – d.1966) was an Egyptian Islamic theorist and pioneering member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. He authored over 20 books on various themes – notably on the social and 
political role of Islam (Roy, 2004).   
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Brotherhood‟s very own adaptation of Hizbut-Tahrir‟s “Al takattol al hizbi,” (Tibi, 
2013). 
In conclusion, Hizbut Tahrir isn‟t a group or a division of the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement and the difference between the two isn‟t only related to 
organization, but it‟s a difference in the philosophy, the approach and the method of 
understanding Islam itself. According to Hizbut Tahrir, the Muslim Brotherhood 
movement is oscillating between Islamic thought on one end and the western 
civilization on the other.  
3.5.3 Hizbut-Tahrir and the Wahhabi Movement 
 
The Wahhabi Movement is an ultraconservative branch of Sunni – Islam which 
resorts back to medieval teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah
9
 and Ahmad ibn Hanbal
10
. 
Unlike Hizbut-Tahrir‟s pacifist approach, they have no objection to using violence as 
a means of attaining their goals (Algar, 2002). 
Hizbut-Tahrir considers that the Wahhabi movement,whichemerged in the 
Arabian Peninsula in the nineteenth century, represented a huge calamity to the 
Islamic Umma.This was mainly due to the role of Wahhabism in contributing to the 
collapse Ottoman authority (which represented the Khilafa) in the birthplace of Islam. 
According to the Islamic Liberation party, the Wahhabists resorted to the infidel west 
and adopted that deviant path to compromise the foundations of the caliphate state 
and impose itself on Arabian Peninsula and gradually move toward the 
Levant.Wahhabist, unlike Hizbut - Tahrir shun practices of veneration of the 
dead(Caldarola, 1982). While the party figures still visit the tombs of their founders 
                                                     
9
Ibn Taymiyyah (b.1263 – d.1328) was an Islamic scholar. He hails from a long line of Islamic 
theologians and he is one of the Godfathers of Wahhabi thought (Roy, 2004).  
10
Ahmad ibn Hanbal (b. 780 - d. 855) is a highly revered Sunni theologian who founded 
the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence (Abu Zahra, 1947). 
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from time to another, the Wahhabist considers such practices as contradictory to the 
principles of Islam (Commins, 2006).  
3.6 Lebanon - A Failed Attempt at a Unified Nation 
 
According to Hizbut -Tahrir, a communityis about a lifestyle, or a way of life. 
Accordingly, and in the view of the party, there is no community in Lebanon. There 
are only different sects, and each sect has a particular lifestyle and purpose; and even 
construes of itself as a community. Therefore and due to its sectarian plurality, 
Lebanon cannot be conceived of as constituting a state because it lacks a sense of one 
community. For Hizbut-Tahrir, there is no reason to celebrate Lebanon‟s sectarian 
diversity. It was only rarely that these sects lived together in peace; and these 
relatively short periods of were only armisticesin the raging conflicts between these 
sects. Since the inception of the Lebanese entity, its history has always been related to 
crisis. In the view of the Party, Lebanon‟s raison d‟être was to provide a safe haven 
for the Christians of the Levant, particularly the Maronites. This dominance of one 
sect triggered fierce competition from the other sects, whereby most of them would 
form a coalition against the strongest one (the Maronites). In the early years of 
Lebanon‟s independence the conflict was primarily a Muslim – Christian conflict. 
While in the post-war period, matters became far more complicated with the 
emergence of a Sunni- Shia conflict, while Christians are divided between the two 
parts: one part supporting the Shiite and the other part supporting the Sunni. For these 
reasons, Lebanon is very far from forming a true state (Abu Al Rashta, 2011). 
 Hizbut- Tahrir refuses to call the Sunnis a sect, but it considers that Muslim 
people who accept being called a sect, have committed a crime to themselves and to 
their families. As for the Shiites, Hizbut -Tahrir does not consider them unbelievers, 
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even though there is a big intellectual problem between the two parties (Hizbut Tahrir 
- Wilayat Lubnan, 2008). 
This chapter discussed the launching and development of Hizbut-Tahrir as an 
Islamic party in Lebanon. It further examined the party‟s relationship and dealings 
with various Sunni and Shia Islamic movements that have presence on the Lebanese 
political scene. Equally important, it shed light on the party‟s critique of the Lebanese 
political model. This critique goes well beyond questioning the democratic nature of 
the Lebanese political model. It cuts into the core of the Lebanese identity casting 
doubts on the viability of Lebanon as a multi-confessional state. The party‟s radical 
stances and its insistence on incorporating Lebanon into a largely Islamic entity (the 
Caliphate state) explain why the party was historically at odds with the Lebanese 
authorities; and why it was equally suppressed during the Pax-Syriana. Question 
marks continue to be raised regarding the party‟s ability to grow beyond a certain 
point in Lebanon, given its rejection of the multi-confessional nature of Lebanon and 
ideological rigidity regarding the restoration of the Khilafa: an old project that is 
rejected not only by Middle Eastern Christians, Shias and seculars, but also by most 
Sunnis.   
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Chapter Four 
 
 
 
Hizbut-Tahrir: Stances and Regional Developments 
 
 
 
While the focus of this thesis has been on Hizbut Tahrir in Lebanon, the party in 
Lebanon does not view itself as isolated from the activities of sister parties in the 
Arab world. As a matter of fact, party ideology does not recognize national 
differences and views the various branches of Hizbut Tahrir as belonging to the same 
mega multi-national party.This chapter begins by discussing the party stances on 
Palestine and its activities withinthe territories that achieved autonomous rule in 1993 
in the aftermath of the Oslo accords; namely the west Bank and Gaza. While many 
factors are associated with the founding of Hizbut-Tahrir, the most notable of these is 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1921. For Hizbut-Tahrir, the Ottoman Empire, 
and despite its shortcomings, embodied the principle of the Khilafa. For centuries, it 
upheld al-Sharia and provided Muslims with protection against the encroachments of 
western-Christian powers. Perhaps most tragically from the Party of Liberation 
standpoint was the association between the Ottoman Collapse and the placement of 
Palestine under British mandate. As aforementioned, this mandate period served as 
the catalyst for the success of the Zionist project in Palestine which culminated with 
the creation of the state of Israel, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinians and the imposition between 1948 and 1967 of Jordanian and Egyptian 
rule in the West Bank and Gaza. In retrospect, the colonial project in both its original 
and mandate forms represented the backdrop for the emergence of Islamic movements 
in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Hizbut-Tahrir was only one of these movements. 
Over the years, the party has grown and spread to all corners of the globe as well as 
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being actively present on the regional Islamic scene (Abu Al Rashta, 2004). 
Therefore, along with an overview of the party‟s role in Palestine, the chapter will 
also look into Hizbut Tahrir‟s stances in light of the Arab Spring revolutions in each 
of Tunisia, Syria and Egypt (the first and second revolutions). The development of 
each of the aforementioned nations‟ revolutions will be scrutinized according to the 
party‟s conviction that what was supposed to be a redemption of Islamic rule in the 
region and a chance to re-establish the caliphate state was hijacked by local agents of 
the United States and the west (Abu Al Rashta, 2004).  
 
4.1 Hizbut-Tahrir’s Views and Criticisms of Recent Developments 
regarding the Palestinian Cause 
 
There is strong evidence to indicate that Hizbut-Tahrir has made a comeback at its 
birth place: Palestine. The party has recently become notorious for its ability to attract 
huge crowds whether in the West Bank or the Gaza strip – this became especially true 
after it‟s re-launch into the Palestinian political scene.In 2013 and according 
Palestinian and Islamic experts,the party was able to mobilize thousands of people to 
march across the Gaza strip′s streets during the 85th memorial of the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire (Fealy, 2007). Just 15 years before, the party′s followers in Gaza 
strip were very few and would not have been able to execute such a spectacle.  
In the early 1990s and with the establishment of an autonomous Palestinian 
authority in the West Bank and Gazaand self-governance in the Palestinian territories, 
some of Gaza‟s youthbegan to actively propagate the party′s thought and ideology 
and thereby attracted a huge number of followers, among which are young, educated 
people who were in conflict with their political organizations. This is how they 
formed a party cell -- that was heavily influenced by al Nabhani writings –which 
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evolved into a party unitand formed the first step in the organizational framework of 
the political party (Al Kasas, 2013).  
In the 15 years that followed the establishment of the self-governance in Palestine, 
the party gradually found itselfable to announce its resurfacing on the Palestinian 
scene and solidified its presence through the crowded marches and festivals that were 
often performed in 2013 in Gaza and the West Bank which were a preparation to enter 
the second phase of its journey.Such peaceful street gatherings echo Hizbut Tahrir‟s 
peaceful ideology which indicates that the party does not use violence as a means to 
establish the Caliphate and often times criticizes the groups and movements that do 
usemilitary violence as a way to attain power. Moreover, it does not discriminate 
against any race or gender. For instance the party condemned the explosions of 
September 11, and considered them criminal because they targeted innocent civilians. 
However, this does not contrast the party‟s willingness to support resistance 
movements in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan or Chechnya.Hizbut-Tahrir does not have a 
military flank, but rather depends on infiltrating society through educating the masses 
on the party thought -- as articulated by al – Nabhani‟s thought – to make crucial 
changes in the political regime. This is what the party calls “political education.” 
Despite its pacifist approach, many of the party‟s members continue to be arrested 
and are banned in Islamic countries because those countries consider that the party is 
in breach of their Islamic principles and dogma.  
References indicate that a few years ago, the party‟s followers in Jerusalem were 
accused of throwing shoes at Ahmad Maher the former Egyptian prime minister 
during his visit to the holy sites in Jerusalem. Accordingly, the Israeli authorities 
arrested a number of people who took part in this assault; in compliance with the 
actions of the Israelis and, simultaneously, the Palestinian security systems took 
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action in other cities such as Al Khalil and arrested the party‟s leaders who were then 
tortured and filmed (Al Kasas, 2013).  
Reports by the local press indicate that the party‟s followers are active in 
Jerusalem through organizing regular activities and giving speeches at religious sites 
as well as through talking about the principles of the party and calling for the 
caliphate. Furthermore, the party‟s intensive efforts and high level of activity is 
mirrored in the various conferences that are constantly being organized in Ramallah, 
Jerusalem, Beit Lahem, Nablus, El – Khalil, Gaza strip and all over Palestine. What 
do you mean in West Bank and Gaza or in Israel proper (historic Palestine). 
In the same spirit of the political activism that Hizbut-Tahrir is engaged in, the party 
calls on the political milieu in Palestine to walk one unified path which dictates that 
Palestine be freed from the sea to the river and refuses every political activity that 
goes against this concept -- whether through elections or otherwise.   
The party also demands a cessation of the competition over power in Gaza strip 
and the West Bank and insists that conciliation based on the division of power and the 
elections is futile. Moreover, Hizbut Tahrir considers that the only way out of this 
conflict over power is to reject the project of the trivial power by both conflicting 
parties and to follow the original conviction – which all Palestinian groups were 
established upon -- that is to liberate the whole of historic Palestine which entails the 
destruction of the state of Israel.  In a press communiqué released by the media office 
of Hizbut-Tahrir in Palestine when was that, the party considered that the presidential 
decision -- a decision taken by current Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas that 
dictates that Palestinians and Israelis should negotiate to reach a compromise 
regarding the two-state solution -- is an instrument of political misguidance and a 
deviation from the principal path of the Palestinian cause. Furthermore, the 
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presidential decision compromises the cause f by creating the diversion of elections 
that do not have any real impact on the conflict between Muslims and the Jewish 
entity that is violating their land. Such elections threaten to surrender most of 
Palestine to the Jews, as they (the elections) will only be executedthrough the 
approval of the Jewish leaders (“Open Letter from Hizbut Tahrir's Media Bureau in 
Palestine to Jurists of the World,” 2014). 
Hizbut - Taharir in Palestine stated that the Palestinian cause is oscillating 
between the political disputes and conflicts when it comes to elections and conditions 
for conciliation. In fact the focus of resistance efforts has shifted to trivial disputes 
over elections and conflict over power which has become the priority for political 
activity among the competitors in Ramallah and Gaza. Furthermore, the party 
proposes its vision for the Palestinian cause and refuses the project of power (current 
electoral system) under the shadow of occupation, stating that: “the Palestinian cause, 
as perceived by any sane and loyal person, is the cause of a violated land that cannot 
be recuperated except through armies who strive for Jihad to plough out the 
occupation from its roots. Moreover, the currently proposed project for reconciliation 
among Palestinians, and according to Hizbut–Tahrir, involves those who are in power 
and under Israeli command and those who represent the opposition against this 
occupation. These are to highly opposing forces; therefore, the party considers that it 
is impossible to bring such contradicting forces together in agreement. Furthermore, 
the party insists that only the opposition should rule over all other incompetent 
movements (“Open Letter from Hizbut Tahrir's Media Bureau in Palestine to Jurists 
of the World,” 2014).  
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The party deems the conciliation treaty
11
 that was signed in Egypt in 2011 as 
wishful thinking because it considers that one side might yield to the other: Would 
Ramallah‟s authority (which is represented by Fatah) forgo its support – in the view 
of Hizbut – Tahrir -- for the Jewish entity and side with the resistance and Jihad, or 
would Hamas,in Gaza, cede the choice of resistance and follow in the political line of 
Ramallah authority? Predictably, neither side would abandon its political ideals to 
accommodate the other. Further supporting Hizbut – Tahrir‟s accusation that Fatah is 
pro-Zionist, is the fact that the latter forbids the party from organizing the yearly 
ceremonies of commemorating the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, while the Hamas 
government in the Gaza strip announced its intention to allow the party to execute 
those ceremonies. In a statement  distributed to the media, the party says that it has 
sent a notice to the authorities (Fatah) on the ninth of July 2009 revealing its intention 
organize activities for that occasion, however it received reactions to prevent such 
ceremonies in multiple cities, as well as several . In the same year, which saw a strong 
resurfacing of Hizbut - Tahrir, on the Palestinian scene, the party began to intensively 
organize marches and public festivals. Some experts state that when Hamas won the 
2006 parliamentary elections, the party‟s activities in the Palestinian territories were 
again encouraged. Noting this, Fatah attempted to place Hizbut –Tahrir at an 
opposing position to Hamas -- both as Islamic players on the Palestinian political 
scene. This, however, did not last long because Hiazbut – Tahrir continued attacking 
and criticizing Fatah. Weak phrasing  Furthermore, Fatah feared that Hamas would 
employ the activities of Hizbut –Tahrir to its benefit – especially after Hamas largely 
participate in the protests that Hizbtut –Tahrir organized against the Annapolis 
                                                     
11
A treaty that was signed by Fatah, Hamas and other Palestinian groups, in Cairo in 2011. The treaty 
was sponsored by the former Head of intelligence, Omar Suleiman, during the reign of Hosni 
Moubarak and aimed to lessen tensions between various Palestinian groups and find a political 
settlement regarding governmental and electoral issues.  
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conference
12
 for peace – which Mahmoud Abbas attended (“Open Letter from Hizbut 
Tahrir's Media Bureau in Palestine to Jurists of the World,” 2014). 
In 2007, during the Annapolis conference protests and after the gunning down of 
one of the Hizbut – Tahrir‟s followers by security systems dependant to the authority 
(Fatah) in Al Khalil city in the strip, the relation between Hizbut Tahrir and the 
authority reached the highest levels of tension. The Hamas-backed Ihab al Ghossein, a 
spokesman for the Ministry of Interior in the government of Ismail Hannya, declared 
that “the government in Gaza does not prevent Hizbut-Tahrir from organizing 
ceremonies in Gaza as long as it does not breach any of the legal requirements.” 
However, this fragile agreement between the Hamas and Hizbut –Tahrir on the issue 
of resistance to the occupation disintegrated when Hamas arrested some members 
from Hizbut - Tahrir in Gaza because they distributed a statement in the strip‟s streets, 
which directly criticized the speech of Khaled Machaal
13
 in July 2009 after he 
acknowledged the Palestinian state on the boarders of 1967 and declared that he was 
willing engage in dialogue with the administration. What administration what are you 
talking about  In their statement, Hizbut-Tahrir declares that “Hamas movement is 
vagueon its views regarding the international and Arab decisions that acknowledge 
the two states” and the party enlightens that Hamas‟ approval for the international 
agreements does not differ from eventually endorsing those same agreements. The 
party confirmed that it advised Hamas not to run for the elections under the 
occupation, but Hamas did not pay any attention to this advice, on the contrary it 
interpreted it as misguided (Ayoob, 2008).  
                                                     
12
The Annapolis Conference was held in Annapolis, Maryland on November 27, 2007, at the United States 
Naval Academy. The purpose of the conference was to reinitiate the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. 
Negotiations between both sides ensued after the conference. 
13
Khaled Machaal is the head of Hamas political bureau since 2004 and after Israel assassinated Abdel Aziz 
al-Rantissi. 
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During a conference held in Ramallah, in June 2013, Hizbut –Tahrir clarified 
some of their positions regarding the Political game in Palestine. These include the 
party‟s support for the: the Muslim Brotherhood (Hamas) if they ascend to power. In 
fact, Hizbut - Tahrir will directly acknowledge them because the objective, as they 
claim, is to apply Islamic law (Sharia). Moreover, they believe that the party isn‟t 
Salafi-based, but still calls for dialogue with such Islamic movements. Third, Hizbut - 
Tahrir declared in the conference that the party is friendly with Hamas, but Hamas 
rejects this offer of friendship.  For as Abou El Nour, one of a Hizbut - Tahrir‟s 
leaders, declares the Palestinian government led by Hamas in the strip adheres to an 
illegitimate authority because this authority was founded on the Oslo Accords
14
 for 
Palestinian autonomy, so it does not apply the Islamic order. Furthermore, the party 
considers that it is different from Hamas movement in the sense that it is a Palestinian 
movement while Hizbut Tahrir is international. Fourth, a monthly newsletter entitled 
the consciousness “Al Wai‟i,” which is a political newspaper distributed in the 
Palestinian territories was launched after the 2013 conference. Fifth, the party 
classifies more than ten countries in the world – including USA, the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Russia-- as nations fighting against Muslims. Sixth, during this 
conference, some of the party‟s activists praised the general secretary of Hezbollah as 
they consider Hezbollah honest in its work even if its ideology contradicts that of 
Hizbut – Tahrir. Seventh, Hizbut - Tahrir considers that Talban movement is created 
by the Pakistani intelligence. Eighth, Hizbut - Tahrir forbids killing innocent civilians 
and condemns such acts in Iraq; the party is also against the sedition separating 
between Sunnis and Shiites. Ninth, some parties accuse Hizbut -Tahrir of resembling 
                                                     
14
 The Oslo Accords, set in 1993 and 1995 are a set of agreements between the government of Israel and 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by which each party recognized the other. This paved the way 
for the Oslo peace process which aimed to fulfill the Palestinian people’s right to self-governance.  
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to Al Qaeda, sans the weapons, but Hizbut -Tahrir rejects this. Tenth, in response to 
the Jordanian Intelligence‟s accusation of Hizbut - Tahrir as a party led by Britain, the 
party‟s activists reply that there is no evidence to support this (“Open Letter from 
Hizbut Tahrir's Media Bureau in Palestine to Jurists of the World,” 2014). 
Palestine was always the birthplace of the party‟s ideology. Al Nabahni‟s early 
experiences of marginalization of entire Palestinian communities and the western 
support for Zionism were the incentives upon which he would launch his party. 
Therefore, it was only logical to dedicate an entire chapter to the cause to enlighten 
the reader on the circumstances from which the party materialized and revisit that 
environment today to tie into how the cause endures and how the party‟s relationship 
with it has developed. Therefore, the most notable topic tackled in this chapter is the 
party‟s view of the Palestinian cause in recent times and the chain of events  leading 
to the reconciliation between various Palestinian political groups and Hizbut-Tahrir‟s 
views on that reconciliation as well as the controversial two-state solution. In light of 
all this, Hizbut Tahrir considers that the sole salvation to all the complications 
generated by the stagnating Palestinian cause (as well as other pending dilemmas in 
the region) is the re-establishment of the Caliphate state.  
4.2 Hizbut –Tahrir in Light of the Arab Spring 
 
The early stages of the Arab spring might have held a glimmer of hope for Hizbut 
Tahrir that Islamic redemption was imminent. According to a statement distributed by 
the party‟s youth in the strip of Gaza, Hizbut - Tahrir considers that the recently 
erupted Arab Spring revolutions represent a potential chance for transformation in the 
process of the Islamic nation after a long period of repression, ignorance and 
coercion. The party addressed a speech to the nation saying that: “The real revolution 
must break any link with the west and its systems.” It also states that:“the practical 
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plan for change must follow the path of the messenger Mohamad since real change 
requires gaining the loyalty of the true adherents of Islam and is founded upon the 
pillars of God and his messenger instead of being subject to the capitals of the 
unbelieving countries. According to the party, parliamentary elections are useless 
since they cater to populations instead of God‟s true religion (Islam) and its leaders 
turn to the west for guidance instead of siding with the Islamic Umma in its great 
battle for liberation. 
The revolutions that sprang up in the Arab region, starting from Tunisia and 
reaching Syria, signified the collapse of the dictatorial regimes that had, for a long 
time, neglected the concerns of the Umma. These “revolutions” were a promise of 
return of power to the advocates of the Islamic Umma. For if the Umma retains its 
rulers, it thereby also retains its power in determining political outcomes and 
enforcing the Islamic ideals it holds so dear. Only then will it be able to liberate itself 
from western hegemony and move forward to address the causes it cares for – most 
notable among them is the liberation of Palestine (Tibi, 2013).  
The revolutions that have risen from the year 2010 until now have significantly 
altered the general scene and made the people‟s voice much louder than before. These 
revolutions, however, have failed to yield fruit in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya or Yemen, in 
addition to Syria whose tyrant is yet to fall. According to Hizbut – Tahrir, what has 
happened so far is that rulers fell, but the reigning regimes did not. The current ruling 
systems that are resilient in these countries are secular and their practices and are still 
connected to international policies that do not serve the Islamic countries‟ interest, but 
cater instead to the western nations‟ objectives (Manhire, 2012).  
With further regional development and as the storm settled over the region, Hizbut 
– Tahrir revealed that what has come to be known as the Arab Spring is in fact closer 
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to a grand Middle East project, or conspiracy, that is being orchestrated by the United 
States. The aim of this grand conspiracy is to create a new political, economic and 
educational culture which the US sought to accommodate and fund (secretly) until the 
threads of this scheme began to unravel and surface. The details of said conspiracy 
were clarified in an analysis conducted by British newspaper, The Guardian, which 
attested that the west is relentless in its mission to control the Mideast – which brings 
back to memory the period of direct colonialism that divided the Arab and Islamic 
countries. Furthermore, The Guardian attests that the United States, and its allies, 
worked on promoting the concept of moderate Islam and ascended representatives of 
this version of Islam to power in various Arab nations. These moderates were armed 
with the capitalist and democratic doctrines (of American democracy) which steer 
them far from the principles of Islam and the concepts of Sharia law,” (A. Al Kasas, 
personal communication, January 27, 2014). 
One should always keep in mind that the west didn‟t and will never surrender its 
interests in the Middle East without a fight. That is why when it became evident that 
those puppet rulers – or what Hizbut – Tahrir considers as US agents -- were on the 
brink of removal (due to the Arab spring conflicts), the United States retaliated and 
acted swiftly. For one thing, the Bush administration introduced the concept of 
“Moderate Islamists” after decades of rejecting political Islam as a foreign and 
undesirable concept. Suddenly, the United States seemed to embrace a modified 
version of political Islam – the very model that was flourishing all over the Arab 
Spring nations in post-conflict times. This is evident through the US‟s eagerness to 
support public movements even though many of them were of an Islamic nature. This 
interpretation of political Islam, and the Arab spring events that paved the way for its 
founding, were concocted during the presidency of George W. Bush.  In fact, the 
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United States had struck deals with the moderate Islamists before anyone had even 
heard of the Arab spring developments (A. Al Kasas, personal communication, 
January 27, 2014). 
Many politicians, thinkers and analysts treated this subject thoughtfully and 
confirmed that external parties were interfering with the course of events that would 
greatly affect a large number of oppressed populations who had deeply suffered from 
the oppressive corrupted systems. They also confirmed that what was called the Arab 
spring is nothing more than an illusion orchestrated, by that the US‟s intelligence and 
media forces, with the objective of leading the people to believe that they were 
responsible for ousting their corrupt rulers and that the west had no role to play in this 
(Al Nabhani, 2001). Accordingly, the youth would be misguided if they adopt western 
concepts of democracy and civil state and falsely believe that such concepts are not 
opposing to Islam, and as if the people themselves had chosen these concepts and 
slogans. Hizbut – Tahrir sources further elaborate on this grand process of a 
misguided revolution by attesting that as preparation for what is called the Arab 
spring, and two years prior to it, the United States trained Arab youth in Serbia on the 
process of the peaceful demonstration (i.e. how to rally up the masses and build up the 
revolution). These trainings, according to Agence France-Presse (AFP), cost the 
American government around 50 million Euros. General Houssam Souwaylem, the 
Egyptian strategic expert confirms to Egypt-based Al Hayat channel that the report of 
the International Institute for the Research on Globalization, in Washington, states 
that the CIA and the Pentagon have set plans to change the ruling systems according 
to modern ways starting with inciting youth communities -- who are linked through 
electronic social media -- to spread tumult and riot and work in groups aiming at 
creating ruling systems that support the USA and assist it in executing its plans in the 
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Mideast. This analysis of America‟s schemes is in harmony with Hizbut – Tahrir‟s 
own view (El Husseini, 2013).  
4.3Hizbut Tahrir’s Activities in the Framework of Revolutionary 
Activism under the“Arab Spring” 
 
The Arab Spring revolutions fell during the reign of current Hizbut Tahrir leader 
Ata‟a Bin Khalil Abu Rachta. Therefore the party‟s activities during these revolutions 
are largely dictated by Abu Rachta and an overview of his life is due: 
Ata‟a Bin Khalil Abu Rachta was born in 1943 to a small religious family in Raana 
village in Al Khalil. He received his Baccalaureate in civil engineering from Cairo 
University in 1966 and proceeded to work as an engineer in various Arab countries. 
He wrote a book entitled Al Wasit which discusses methods of building and road 
surveillance. His religious writings include a book entitled Studies in the Principles of 
Fiqh. He has been involved in the Hizbut-Tahrir party since his early years in the 
1950s. By the 1980s, he had become a leading member of the party in Jordan and was 
officially appointed as the party‟s first official spokesperson. In 2003 and after the 
death of Sheikh Abdul Qadeem Zalloum, Abu Rachta became the third to be elected 
head of Hizbut – Tahrir after al Nabhani and Zalloum.  Abu Rachta explains, in an 
interview, the rationale for the party‟s involvement in the Arab spring developments 
in the following way:   
“Our mission has not changed in any place where there is an opportunity for us to 
execute our mission --which is carrying the call to go on with the Islamic life by 
establishing the Caliphate according to the path of our messenger Mohamed, may 
peace be upon him, since the mission in Mecca till building the state in Medina. That 
is why we call on people to join us in our mission because Caliphate is a great 
obligation that we must fulfill. This is how we interact with the Umma cooperating 
with it and through it to achieve this. We also call on people of power asking them to 
support us to establish the Caliphate and advise them not to waste their efforts by just 
changing people without changing all the laic system. This is what we [as a party] 
have done and will keep doing before and after the revolutions. However, the 
circumstances of the revolutions created a bigger venue for people listen to the voice 
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of justice without fearing the security systems like before; for this reason we see 
people nowadays gathered around us.” (Abu Rashta, 2006). 
 
Evidently, Hizbut –Tahrir leaders regard the Arab spring events as a prime 
opportunity to steer the Arab populations toward the greater Umma because it has 
evolved into a time where people were challenging the existing regimes. In such 
chaos, change to their credit, would be possible. Furthermore, and according to Abu 
Rachta, people previously hesitated to join the party because they feared the security 
systems. Nowadays, the party‟s activity is not only remarkably noticed in the areas of 
revolution, but also extends beyond the Arab world. For instance, Abu Rachta 
explains that the party enjoys strong activity in Pakistan, although there is no 
revolution actually taking place there. In areas of strong conflict, such as Syria, party 
activity has noticeably expanded because the obstacle of fear collapsed when people 
revolted against oppression and tyranny (Abu Rashta, 2006). 
4.3.1The Arab Spring and the Case of Tunisia 
 
When one takes Tunisia as an example for the first spark of the Arab spring 
revolutions, it can be observed that the incident didn‟t start on the seventeenth of 
December 2010 with the self-immolation of Mohamad Bouazizi In fact the incidents 
started in Tunisia with the forming of a coalition of a huge base of parties --
associations and organizations from the civil society -- under a block entitled “The 
Movement of 18
th
 of October for the Rights and Liberties.” This coalition dates back 
to 2005 and is supported by the USA. It playsan effective role in the political 
movement according to the American terms (Bay, 2014). 
It is evident that the program is subject to America‟s goals because, (as it is set by 
the movement of 18
th
 of October) it fulfills the requirements of the USA under the 
title of the “Freedom of Speech and Press” and the freedom of establishing parties and 
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associations, lifting restrictions on their activities, releasing the empoisoned 
politicians, ensuring the return of the refugees and granting them esteem according to 
a law of general amnesty for every oppressed person. On the other hand, the 
movement of 18
th
 of October encompasses a big number of parties and civil 
organizations which are aided by the USA and adopt the process of political 
conciliation with those who are called the “moderate Islamists,” (Bay, 2014). 
These western-influenced parties are: The liberal Democratic Party, the party of 
conference for the republic, the workers communist Tunisian party (which became the 
workers Tunisian party), the Democratic Coalition for liberties, and other parties and 
organizations such as the International organization for Imprisoned Politicians 
Assistance and the Tunisian Association to Resist Torture. 
The main objective of the 18
th
 of October movement of is to divide the Tunisian 
people into categories that are represented by parties and associations; this is at the 
core of the American plan to achieve its dominative objectives. Further supporting the 
argument that America was brewing this stew of moderate Islamists is the visit of a 
delegation from the US embassy in 2006 to Hamadi Al Jibali, the secretary-general of 
Renaissance movement – a moderate Islamic movement. This visit, which lasted three 
hours and surprised some parties in power at that time, addressed many issues related 
to the Renaissance movement and its future role in the change required by the USA in 
Tunisia as well as the attitude of the movement toward US politics in the region. The 
USA has launched and is still exercising a most dangerous campaign of misguidance 
not only in Tunisia, but in the whole Islamic Umma -- especially in places where the 
revolutions of the Arab spring had quickly erupted. What was called the Tunisian 
revolution has offered USA the opportunity to proceed in its “Great Middle East” 
project in the region, which explains the declarations of John Kerry, a Democratic 
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senator and then president of the External affairs commission,when he said that: “The 
outcomes of president Bin Ali‟ escape will exceed Tunisia, as the Middle East 
includes young people aspiring for a future free of any political oppression and 
economical corruption.” In light of the political evolutions that occurred in the Middle 
East and which led to the collapse of some ruling regimes and to tumult in others, and 
despite the distorted reporting of these events by the Media (which portrayed the 
revolutions as revolutions of oppressed people demanding just political change on the 
bases of democracy and public liberties) it shows that this is nothing but a USA claim. 
In fact, the United States is eager to show that the Arab people themselves want this 
democracy and political pluralism, and coincidentally, these are principles it, and 
other western countries, agree with wholeheartedly and  is willing to defend with all 
means of power available (Abu Rashta, 2012).  
4.3.2The Arab Spring and the Case of Syria 
 
 More so, Hizbut Tahrir employs all its media potential and human resources in 
the provinces (wilayat) of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan and strongly engages in field 
activism. However, their activities in Syria are limited due to regular persecution by 
the security systems. Consequently, it has had better success in Lebanon and Jordan 
as it was able to mobilize a tradition of Friday demonstrations which was launched 
after the beginning of the Syrian crises in support of the public movement.          
By the fourth month of the Syrian revolution and with the resilience and even 
aggravation of the crisis, some sheikhs, who were proponents of of Hizbut – Tahrir, 
preached to the demonstrators that victory was in sight and that the declaration of the 
caliphate will launch from Syria – as Syria is the core of the Levant (Bilad al Sham) 
(source). One can note evidence of these preaching speeches on Youtube. One 
example is that ofSheikh Youssef El Eid in Al Hajar mosque in Al Nawa 
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AlHawraniyya village). The speech was given before a crowded population in the 
village square, where the Sheikh preached of the imminent victory and the building of 
the Islamic caliphate. 
Some opposing parties, writers and analysts got accustomed to denying the 
Islamic characteristics that marked Syrian activism. This Islamic feel, however, is 
natural of any nation which has inherited Islamic religious culture for long 
generations. The critics, however, refute this and claim that the revolutions rose from 
people-based and spontaneous origins thereby completely bypassing a significant role 
of the sheikhs. . On these grounds, everyone shifted from extreme leftists -- such as 
the Communist labor party -- to extreme rightists -- such as the Socialist Union party -
- to ride the tide of the usual protestations that will launch every time and everywhere 
there is public mobilization -- this, of course, includes the greatest democratic 
countries. Hizbut – Tahrir, however attests that it is very difficult for any opposing 
leadership to claim that it played any effective role. Only the sheikhs played a 
significant role in the revolutions. In parallel to that role – but not as influential – 
came the contribution of the revolutionaries who set up social media pages that spiked 
the revolutions, as well as the role of regional and international news cooperation (e.g. 
CNN, Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia etc.) (Roy, 2004). 
In its very first calling since the beginning of the revolution in Syria, Hizbut – 
Tahrir declared:  “All ye Muslims in Syria, let it be an Islamic revolution, notcivil 
revolution, nor a democratic revolution, may Allah grant you victory” (Nasra, 2011). 
In a press release issued by Hizbut - Tahrir, pertaining to the “The Caliphate 
Commemoration Conference,” which was held in Indonesia, the party declared that 
all Islamic – Arab and non-Arab – nations want the Islamic Caliphate. The press 
release, which was entitled “Damascus Revolution is the strongest Issue in the 
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Caliphate Commemoration Conference,” explains that the head of Hizbut – Tahrir‟s 
media bureau in Syria, Hicham Al Baba, gave a speech at the conference which 
declared that: “The nation wants an Islamic Caliphate, Syria wants an Islamic 
Caliphate, Jakarta wants an Islamic Caliphate, the nation wants the Caliphate again, 
repeat it while crying and supplicate Allah to witness the Caliphate soon…” 
Furthermore, the press release states that Indonesian youth party members insisted on 
being the first to build the Caliphate, where the head of the Indonesian bureau in 
Hizbut - Tahrir (Indonesia branch) stated: “We will be the ones to build it and our 
Sheikh Ata‟a bin Khalil Abu El Rachta shall be our Caliph.” To which Hicham Al 
Baba replied: “The people of the Levant agree on what you said, Allah knows where 
the allegation would be, let‟s say what Allah said: let the competitors compete,” (Al 
Baba, 2013). 
In one of their habitual Friday press releases, entitled “Levant (Damascus) the 
home of Islam,” it was dictated that the Syrian people declared the revolution Islamic 
despite the American restrictions. Hicham Al Baba declares: “It is known all 
stakeholders in the Syrian conflict, whether friend or foe, are targeting the Syrian 
revolution. Hizbut - Tahrir irritates the enemies of Allah and his messenger; these 
enemies are even refusing to call Syria the home of Islam, claiming that it‟s a Hizbut 
–Tahrir concocted nomination. For this reason, the media office of the party in Syria 
is calling all the loyal Muslims, in and outside of the Levant, to follow the messenger 
of God and make it a true Friday to combat the disbelievers armed with the messenger 
of God‟s words: “Levant (Damascus) is the home of Islam.” Hizbut - Tahrir media 
office in Pakistan sees that taking part in the activism in Syria is crucial. This stance is 
echoed in a press release, dated July 17, 2013, that states that supporting the people of 
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the Levant is an obligation for the Pakistani army (who has the weapons) and not only 
an obligation of Taliban (Al Baba, 2013). 
In an exploratory visit to the city of Al Rakka – an area that has been liberated 
from Al Assad regime, Hicham Al Baba, met closely with prominent figures and 
activists of the Syrian revolution who expressed their happiness toward Hizbut 
Tahrir‟s ideas, acts and attitudes. Al Baba, and after meeting with some figures of the 
city, later gave a speech at the city‟s mosque in the central market. The speech was to 
the audience of a huge crowd and covered the risks threatening the Syrian revolution, 
mainly in the light of the last progressing American campaign aiming at reinforcing 
Al Assad regime and putting a dead end to the revolution though calling for the 
Geneva II conference
15
(Al Baba, 2013).  
Among the sacrifices the party made forthe Syrian revolution, Hizbut - Tahrir 
mentions the killing of one of its activists in Syria -- Yasser Nouhad (Abou Ammar) 
who was killed in Al Kusair battle on May 19, 2013. Other sacrifices include 
repetitive assaults on the residence of the head of media office in Syria, in addition to 
the torture that many of the party‟s activists in the prisons were subject to. It is worth 
noting that due to necessary precaution in Syria in the past decades and because of the 
secretive nature of its work, there is a very limited amount of resources pertaining to 
the party‟s activity prior to the war. Although the party in Syria dates back to the 
1950s, it isn‟t until very recently that it has made an appearance on the Syrian scene 
through its publications which entail the party‟s views on all developments in the 
Syrian civil war (Al Baba, 2013).  
                                                     
15
 The Geneva 2 conference was held in January 2014 in Montreux and Geneva and spanned nine 
days. The conference aimed to bring opposing Syrian parties together to negotiate for peace and put 
an end to the Syrian Civil War. No consensus was reached and another conference will be planned.   
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The conflict in Syria produced ripple effects in the form of assaults and bombings 
of the southern suburb of Beirut. These assaults were targeting Hezbollah strongholds 
and came as an answer to that party‟s involvement in Syria whereby it is supporting 
Al Assad‟s regime. This is biased It reflects the views of critics of Hezbollah  
Although Hizbut – Tahrir has suffered plenty at the hands of the Syrian regime and 
Hezbollah, it condemned  the assaults on the southern suburb because killing innocent 
civilians – irrespective of where and how – contradicts the principles of Islam (A. Al 
Kasas, personal communication, January 27, 2014). 
Hizbut – Tahrir‟s publications in Syria, indicate that the party is urgently warning 
against the dangerous foreign interventions in Syria These include mainly the French 
and American   interests in the area, whereby the party considers that France and USA 
are exploiting some leaders from the opposition to control the revolution in Syria and 
set forth their preferred rules and agenda in the Arab region. The party‟s media office 
in Syria declared in a bulletin published on January 23, 2013 -- and that came in 
response to Laurent Fabius‟s invitation to Hizbut – Tahrir , other members of the 
Syrian opposition and representatives of countries supporting the national opposition 
coalition to meet in France and discuss the situation in Syria  -- under the title of: 
“France in Syria as in Mali, fighting Islam and Moslems,” “We at Hizbut Tahrir 
address the Syrian opposition and remind them that the West built their coalition to 
reach its goals and not to save the Syrian Muslim people, and to remind them as well 
that the West will not give them money or weapons unless they (the opposition) 
become their instruments to impose colonial politics and combat Islam and loyal 
Muslims,” (Al Baba, 2013).  
Commenting on the Syrian People Friends‟ Conference, Hicham El Baba wrote: 
“The US is drowning in its conspiracy against the Syrian people and in its support for 
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Al Assad‟s murderous and butcher regime. This conference is similar to the others 
where the USA and the countries of Western Europe have tried to take control over 
the incidents in Syria in order to achieve their interests and consolidate their 
sovereignty in the region.” During and before this conference, the national coalition 
made serious promises to arm the opposition; at the same time, the US prevented 
other participating countries from providing weapons with the pretext that these 
weapons might be captured by the extremist Islamists. The US secretary of foreign 
affairs department John Kerry asserted that the USA is attempting to reach a political 
solution and added: “The opposition coalition could help in achieving a peaceful 
change.” The party, in fact, considers the USA the main catalyst behind the 
catastrophe in Syria, so how is it then logical to seek its assistance in finding a 
solution? USA is the fierce enemy of Islam and the greatest supporter of Israel. 
Hizbut – Tahrir considers that on the outside, it appears that the US and the Syrian 
regime are highly antagonistic. However, both have shared interests in putting out the 
Syrian struggle and the Islamic flavor it has adopted and thereby – indirectly – 
protecting Israel‟s border from the ripple effects of the Syrian crisis. The New York 
Times reported on February 28, 2013from US officials that the administration ordered 
them to train fighters from the opposition in an undetermined location. The newspaper 
also reported, from the same source, that the current training mission represents the 
deepest form of US interference in the Syrian conflict. It adds that the US aspires to 
weaken the extremist groups through supporting the Syrian opposition coalition (Al 
Baba, 2013). 
In conclusion Hizbut – Tahrir – Wilayat Syria refuses to take part in any dialogue 
or conference asking for any form of settlement with the “criminal” regime of Bachar 
Al Assad. Briefly, Hizbut - Tahrir considers that the United States is conspiring 
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against the Syrian revolution, thereby subordinating the Arab rulers who support US 
policies in the Mideast, and taking advantage of the Russian – Chinese attitude for its 
interests. Furthermore, America is mobilizing the Islamic regime in Iran and its 
followers in Iran and Iraq -- who have been employing their armies to defeat the 
revolutionists -- by giving them ammunition support. All these actions aim to force 
the revolutionists to accept their terms and surrender to them.  
4.3.3The Arab Spring and the Case of Egypt – First Revolution 
 
On the second commemoration of the revolution of the 25
th
 of January in Egypt, 
Charaf Zayed, Hizbutb –Tahrir‟s spokesman in Egypt wilaya, confirms in his press 
release the following:  
“Two years after the revolution, the situation didn‟t change, it didn‟t overthrow 
the regime nor end the corruption; despite the fact that some Islamists reached the 
positions of power, political Islam is still far away from power. During these past two 
years, the nation only witnessed different parties battle it out over who would attain. 
On one end, we see the so-called Islamists claiming to apply Sharia‟a (the Islamic 
law) and from the other side we see the laics screaming for democracy and 
frightening the adherents of the Sharia‟a. The only thing the various party leaders care 
about is attaining posts and power while USA is heavily interfering in all of Egypt‟s 
affairs. The current American ambassador meets regularly with the president of the 
elections high commission and none of the parties object to this as if it is something 
usual. US delegations of all American institutions of power, regularly visit Egypt to 
for monitoring purposes. Surely, the people who overthrew Mubarak and his 
followers cannot remain silently accepting of the regime which ruled through 
Mubarak – the very same regime that protected Israel for thirty years while American 
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continues to interfere in the country‟s economic affairs as   Egypt the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) dictates its terms on the Egyptian economy,” (Zayed, 2013).” 
 In further criticism of the revolution, Zayed adds that the post – revolution regime 
is following in the steps of the pre-revolution regime and mentions the report of: 
“Terrorism Progress for the year 2013” (issued by the US department of state on May 
30, 2013) which considers that the Egyptian government continues to oppose violent 
extremism and that Egypt is persevering its efforts to improve security on the boarder 
lines with the assistance of the US. The report mentions that the Egyptian officers on 
the boarders closely monitor the list of the extremists who are committing violence. It 
must be clarified here that these extremist (as they are dubbed by Egypt and the US 
contain members of the political Islamic community to which Hizbut – Tahrir 
belongs). The report indicates that the US encourages Egypt to cooperate with it in 
order to stop the contraband of weapons and explosives to Gaza strip and to focus on 
securing the border and banning the transfer of weapons. It also points out that the US 
maintains a strong bond with Egypt and Israel to ensure security in Sinaa  -- 
especially after  the terrorist assault on Egyptian soldiers in Rafah on May 8, 2013). 
The media office of Hizbut Tahrir in Egypt replied to this report by stating: First, it is 
known that what US considers as fighting terrorism is fighting Islam. Second, when 
the US talks about improving security procedures on the boarder lines, it means the 
eastern boarders to secure the continued well-being of the Jew state. Third, Egypt‟s 
post regime‟s interjections between Palestinians and Israelis and the mediation 
operations it commenced mirror those previously executed by the pre revolution 
regime of Mubarak (Zayed, 2013). One notable example of post regime mediation is 
the interjection of Morsi to secure a cease fire between Gaza and Israel on the 
November 21, 2013.Fourth, indeed, the US has strong ties with Egypt and Israel to 
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reinforce security in Sinaa, however, this cooperation does not aim to find out who 
killed the Egyptian soldiers on May 8, 2013, but it is pioneer cooperation in which the 
actual regime outdid its predecessor. Such contact, with an enemy of the Umma, is 
unacceptable especially one whose hands are still polluted with Muslim blood in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and the Levant. Furthermore, this relationship does not secure Egyptian 
interests and aims mainly at protecting the Jewish. Fifth, and lastly, Zayed asks the 
Egyptian government “Do you really want to consolidate and preserve peace with the 
Jews? It is obvious that you have no will in front of America‟s demands (Zayed, 
2013).  
4.3.4The Arab Spring and the Case of Egypt – Second Revolution 
 
The Egyptian revolution‟s initial success quickly waned as the rule of the Muslim 
Brotherhood failed to address the reform which the revolution had promised. In light 
of the Egyptian population‟s dissatisfaction with Morsi‟s rule, the former minister of 
defense, Abdel Fattah Al Sissi, who is now a presidential candidate, declared on 
Wednesday, July 3, 2013what he called “The future map of the country.” This map 
includes working under the constitution on temporary basis, dismissing the 
democratically elected president and running early presidential elections provided that 
the head of the constitutional court be in charge of the country‟s affairs during the 
provisional phase until a new president is elected. The head of the high constitutional 
court shall be given the authority to issue constitutional declarations during the 
provisional phase. He pointed out the forming of a competent national government. 
This is how the army would have turned against the so-called democracy, which made 
Morsi a legitimate ruler for the country in the first place and as they claim. This coup 
d‟état occurred under the pretext of refusing the public administration “harming the 
national and the religious state institutions” along with frightening and threatening all 
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the citizens. How could they call themselves democratic after they closed religious 
channels and arrested hundreds of Islamic movements‟ members? Therefore there is 
no doubt that it is the army who had the real power during the last phase while the 
president and his followers were nothing more than puppets for the US backed 
military institution. It is also obvious that Islam cannot reach power through that 
democracy and its laic voting systems -- as if they didn‟t learn from what happened to 
the rescue front (Jabhat al Inkaz) in Algeria. Let us hope that they finally learn and 
realize that truth (Zayed, 2013). 
Hizbut –Tahrir considers that the government of  Dr. Hazem Al Bablawi was 
formed under the approval of the US, and in coordination with the Egyptian Military 
Board an many of the parliamentary members that it included where adherents of 
Mubarak‟s regime. For example, Nabil Fahimi, the Egyptian minister of foreign 
affairs in this government was a diplomat who served in New York as either as 
ambassador of Egypt to the States or as a representative to the United Nations. It is 
worth noting that Fahmi holds an American passport and is thereby an American 
citizen (Zayed, 2013).  
The entire Arab world knows that the Americans are brewing a conspiracy in 
Egypt to turn all against the movements that support the ousted president Mohamad 
Morsi. Further supporting such efforts isAbdul Fattah Al Sissy‟s crack down on the 
Muslim Brotherhood‟s demonstrations. Hizbut - Tahrir considers here that the last 
military decisions on April 24, 2013 in Egypt hold dangerous indicators that must be 
revealed. In fact, Al Sissy clearly demonstrates that all the designations of provisional 
president, prime minister and government are only a formal aspect for the coup d‟état 
that occurred on June 30 and that the true ruler is AL Sissy and all these people are 
puppets who support him. Al Sissy‟s efforts to empower himself succeeded as Morsi 
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was ousted and currently facing trial for the very accusations that Hizbut – Tahrir is 
subjecting Al Sisy too (violent persecution of demonstrators)  As a response to the 
developments in Egypt, the Jew entity radio channel stated on Monday June 24, 2013 
Israeli president Shimon Perez expressed again his concern over what he described as 
then potential catastrophic results on Israel had the military coup d‟état – spearheaded 
by Al Sisy -- failed in Egypt. All these recent developments in Egypt attest to the 
nation‟s deviation from then rightful path of Islam and demonstrate how the 
revolution had been hijacked by opponents of Islam and the ideologies that Hizbut –
Tahrir supports. At the end, Hizbut - Tahrir warns from following this criminal 
planning that would cost the nation huge losses and killing of people and will only be 
beneficial for the nation‟s awaiting enemies (Tibi, 2013).  
This chapter attended to Hizbut-Tahrir‟s stances regarding the latest developments 
on the Arab, Islamic and International fronts and its view on the possible solutions 
that accompany the unraveling chain of events in the region.The most notable topics 
tackled in this chapter are the party‟s view of the Palestinian cause and the most 
recent occurrences on the internal front -- including the Palestinian reconciliation 
between various political groups and Hizbut-Tahrir‟s view on the two-state solution. 
It offered an overview of current party leader Abu Rashta‟s life and expanded into his 
and the party‟s interpretation of the neighboring revolutions. Furthermore, this 
chapter related the party‟s views regarding the early stages of the “Arab Spring,” and 
how those events allowed for the party to develop its views by which complements 
the convictions and principles of Hizbut-Tahrir and its consideration for the priority 
of setting up the Islamic caliphate. Moreover, the chapter zooms in on the party‟s 
stances pertaining to Tunisia, Syria and Egypt (first and second revolutions) and 
discusses how the party interpreted the political development of each crisis.    
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Chapter Five 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This study represents a small contribution to the burgeoning literature on Islamist 
movements. It is focused on one specific movement that has received scant attention 
from researchers: Hizbut-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party). The study opens with a 
discussion of the career and thought of the party's founder, Sheikh Taqquiddin al 
Nabhani, from his early beginnings in Palestine until his death in Lebanon. A broad 
timeline of his political career and intellectual oeuvre is also presented. Beyond 
situating the life of the party founder in its proper historic and ideational context, 
considerable space is allocated to the socio-political environment that influenced his 
thought and his many writings. Indeed, Al- Nabhani  evolved in a rich environment of 
piety and great historical change. Such strong figures as his grandfather, Sheikh 
Youssef Al Nabahni – an eminent Islamic scholar in his own right – and Sheikh 
Mohamad al-Khodor Hussein – an Islamic scholar whose ideas would be incorporated 
into the party that al Nabhani would later establish, were also part of the journey. 
More so, Al Nabahni was influenced with several other pious members of his family 
and various religious intellectuals.  
The political events leading to the 1948 Palestine war and the rise of the “Zionist 
state”also shaped his thoughts and future endeavors. British rule and imminent 
Zionism in the region left a strong negative impression on al Nabhani. In his youth, he 
bore witness to the forceful development of the state of Israel, which had led to the 
marginalization of an entire Arab population and from the point of view of most 
Palestinians“a bitter betrayal from various neighboring Arab states who failed to 
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provide the necessary support that would have rescued Palestine and its people.” Al 
Nabhani considers this last point a conspiracy conducted by the Arabs against 
Palestinians and a grave treachery. His life‟s mission, and that of the party he 
founded, had then been linked to the disaster that befell Muslims and Arabs; and he 
was committed to avenging the victims of this most unfortunate turn of events.  
Due to the difficult situation in Palestine, the party‟s founder relocated to Syria 
where he also faced heavy opposition from the government. Finally, he settled in 
Lebanon, which he considered the most suitable option since Lebanon was more 
liberal than neighboring nations as freedom of speech is much more tolerated in this 
country than other nations of the Middle East. It was in Lebanon that the party 
survived and spread to other parts of the region and then the world. Hizbut Tahrir – 
Wilayat lubnan flourished despite (at least according to al Nabhani) Lebanon‟s failed 
democracy and unfair persecution of the party‟s leading members.The thesis 
pauseshere to examine the flaws that al Nabhani attributes to the Lebanese system. 
For instance, al Nabhani considers that Lebanon‟s democracy is defective and 
unsustainable; his party does not even recognize it as its own separate entity. Instead, 
Lebanon is understood to be state, or wilaya, within the realm of the Islamic Umma. 
The thesis goes on to discuss at length the uneasy relationship between Hizbut Tahrir 
on one end, and the Lebanese security system – within the larger and more influential 
backdrop of Syrian hegemony – on the other. There are several accounts that describe 
how members of Hizbut -Tahrir were persecuted by the Lebanese system and jailed or 
banned from engaging party activities because they expressed an opinion that did not 
please the authorities. Hizbut – Tahrir maintains that throughout all these persecutions 
of the party by the Lebanese and Syrian authorities, the party maintained a pacifist 
approach and did not ever perform violent acts in any of its activities. In fact, the 
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party denounces violence as a means of imposing its views and is instead guided by 
the “peaceful way of Islam” in achieving its goals.  
The thesis also includes sporadic anecdotes of some of the notable individuals and 
events relevant to the party. Such accounts aim to give the reader important 
background information to better grasp the party‟s work and development. Echoing 
this approach is a short chapter on Palestine, the birthplace of both al Nabhani and his 
party, as this chapter creates a wider understanding of the relationship between what 
the party is trying to achieve and what the regional political players (in Palestine) are 
doing – which often contradicts the party‟s plans. An informative representation of 
leadership in both the Gaza strip and the West Bank aims to shed more light on how 
governance in the Palestinian territories deviates from the party‟s vision for Palestine 
and the Arab world. 
A detailed overview of the party‟s ideology and principles was also presented in 
this thesis. This part includes the terms and conditions under which Muslims and the 
Caliph must interact and operate. There are rules for how the caliph‟s election should 
take place and who is eligible to compete. Other rules pertain to the duties of Muslims 
and Non-Muslims within the Caliphate state. The work provides a comprehensive 
overview of party thought for anyone looking to understand how this Islamic 
movement operates. With the omnipresent goal of re-establishing the Islamic 
caliphate, Hizbut – Tahrir‟s views and work are put into perspective. The thesis 
demonstrates how the party ties this most “noble goal” to regional and international 
developments. Its political analysis of the still unraveling Arab revolutions is a prime 
example of how it employs its Islamic-based views to politics. As Hizbut – Tahrir is 
active on the regional and international front, it is expected that its views on regional 
developments will be catered to in this thesis. Therefore, when discussing the Arab 
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spring, the thesis stops at each of Tunisia, Syria and Egypt to address the 
ramifications of each revolution in terms of plans for setting up Islamic rule. The 
party continues to make the argument that the prospect of creating sound Islamic rule, 
which was such a strong possibility at the beginning of the respective revolutions, has 
been severely compromised with the development of events during each revolution. 
Even in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood had taken over, a second revolution 
ousted Morsi and military rule seemed once again imminent. This, the party 
considers, was a grand American scheme to keep Egypt (much like other Muslim-
majority nations) away from the true path of Islamic rule. 
The diverse scope of themes in this thesis represents an in-depth review of Hizbut 
-Tahrir in a historical and political context that has not been addressed before. It has 
given the reader a breadth of information about a relatively obscure party and from all 
aspects too. Having read the thesis, the reader would have been exposed to the party 
from various angles including how it defines itself and how it identifies (or clashes) 
with other Islamic movements and how other entities regard the party as well. The 
party‟s global reach has been highlighted in terms of its role in regional events as well 
as international participation in conferences and activities. Moreover, all the big 
names and notable figures that have emerged within the party,since its launch in 1953 
until the present day, have been introduced. The journey has spread across the three 
reigns that have ensued since party launch in Palestine; the journey from al Nabhani 
to Zalloum to Abu Rashta‟s time has been a rich and enlightening trip. The core 
values of the party which revolve around the restoration of the caliphate have not 
changed. It remains to be seen whether the rapidly unfolding situation in the region 
will contribute to a more hospitable environment to achieve the party‟s overarching 
goal. A selection of party activists who were interviewed for this thesismaintain that 
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the prospects of achieving the party‟s principal goal are better now than at any point 
in the past. The fluidity of the regional situation, the presence of many Islamic 
movement s with competing programs, and the resurgenceof civil society movements 
-- especially in Tunisia and Egypt -- that are skeptical of further attempts to Islamize 
society make it very difficult to predict the future with any certainty. This definitely 
applies to the prospects of reestablishing the Islamic caliphate. 
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